Crossroads region: Central Asia

MORRIS ROSSABI

Central Asia had been vital in contacts between East and West long before 1400. During the Mongol Empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it was the crossroads through which merchants, scientists and envoys trav­eled, generally without hindrance, from one part of the Mongol domain to another, and then to other lands.

Central Asia was difficult to unify, partly owing to the diversity of its landscapes and peoples. A landlocked region, it stretched from the Gansu corridor in China to the borders of Iran, and included the oases and cities that lay between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, as well as much of modern Afghanistan. Its different environments dictated a variety of different economic adaptations. Aridity plagued most of the region except for Ili in northern sections of the modern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Kazakhstan, areas suitable for a nomadic pastoral economy. A second type of economy was based in the oases and towns, which were fortuitously located along the major East-West trade routes. Merchants, artisans and ordinary laborers dominated these venues. Most of these towns developed a self­sufficient agriculture, often supported by carefully husbanded irrigation works, with water from melting snows of the region's lofty mountains.

The same diversity characterized the various Central Asian groups in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The Timurid Empire, which descended from Temur, was predominantly Turkic and dominated much of Central Asia with capitals in Samarkand and Herat. The Timurids relied on Iranian officials to assist in ruling their vast domains, stretching from Central Asia to Iran and West Asia. Because Iranians had experience in governing empires, they proved invaluable to the Timurids. The Ottoman Turks, whose original home­land was also in Central Asia, had moved farther west and would soon detach much of West Asia from Timurid control and destroy the Byzantine Empire and Egypt's Mamluk dynasty. The Uzbeks, descended from the Mongol Khan Ozbeg of the Golden Horde in Russia, were uniting and would soon play a significant role in Central Asia. The Chinese had traditionally been highly involved in the regions neighboring them to the west. Although the Mongol Empire had waned, Mongols still inhabited specific areas in Central Asia. Indians and Russians were poised to involve themselves in the region. This astonishing array of peoples continued to play a role in the region's history through 1800.

Central Asia had traditionally been a cradle for or transmitter of an extraordinary variety of religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Islam. By 1400, Buddhism and Islam, of different sects and orders, dominated.

In 1400, indigenous rulers governed Central Asia. The states and Khanates in the region were independent and were not bound to a foreign empire, Khanate or kingdom. By 1800, Qing dynasty China had encroached upon eastern Central Asia, overwhelming mostly Turkic Muslim peoples and bringing them within its empire. At the same time, Tsarist Russia had gradually gained influence in western Central Asia and was in a strong position to incorporate the region within its domains. Part of the explanation for the expansion of China and Russia in the region lies in what Victor Lieberman has described as a general pattern of growing consolidation and centralization of political units in the early modern and modern worlds, but these changes were also caused by the decline of the Central Asian states.^[CCLXVII]

Ming and Central Asia

After the collapse of Mongol rule in China in 1368, the Ming, an indigenous dynasty, took power.

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14.i Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

century in South China and for 130 years in North China, China sought to limit contact with foreigners to avert another invasion. The first Ming Emperor determined the number of foreign trade and tribute missions permitted to enter China. Despite this generally isolationist policy, the Ming court was determined to control such nearby oases as Turfan and Hami, which it often described as gateways to the Western Regions. Moreover, court officials recognized that they needed to trade for horses for China's self­defense, and they were well aware that some Chinese subjects profited from commerce with China's neighbors to the northwest as well as with more distant regions in Central Asia. The Ming court would not sanction free trade or the Mongol Yuan dynasty's robust support for the Silk Roads, but its realpolitik policies mandated that it allow Central Asian trade and tribute, although under carefully regulated circumstances. It specified the frequency of foreign embassies, the number of men on each embassy, the types of banquets each would receive (which would depend upon a Chinese evalu­ation of the states', Khanates' or towns' power and prestige) and the value of official gifts to the envoys.

Realpolitik frequently subverted the Confucian ideology that underlay Chinese relations with Central Asia. This ideology proposed that Chinese culture was superior to other cultures and that the emperor, as the Son of Heaven, embodied the correct principles for governance and was superior to all other rulers.

The Yongle emperor (r. 1403 to 1424), the dynasty's third emperor, was the first ruler to restore China's domination over the region centered on the Hami oasis.^[270] In 1405, he helped to enthrone Toghto, a reliable Mongol, as the Zhongshun wang (Loyal and Obedient Prince) of Hami. Having been educated at the Chinese court, Toghto was not suited to rule nomadic pastoralists or oasis-dwelling merchants, the two prominent groups in Hami. The indigenous population, composed principally of Uyghurs and some Hui (or Chinese Muslims), reacted adversely to the installation of Toghto, but his death in 1410 afforded the Yongle emperor an opportunity to enthrone Toghto's more capable cousin Mianli Temur as Zhongyi wang (Loyal and Righteous Prince), which made still another Mongol the new governor.^[271] This more experienced and more stable ruler ushered in a period of good relations, which translated into close commercial contact. Within fourteen years, thirty official embassies and no doubt individual commercial missions arrived in Beijing from Hami.^[272] The Ming court generally received such valuable and essential products as horses or sable and squirrel pelts, all of which it could use.

Turfan, eventually the center of power in the region, originally established a peaceful relationship with China, but ultimately also came into conflict with the Ming. In the early fifteenth century, Buddhists and Muslims coex­isted in the town, and indeed Buddhist monks led so-called tribute missions to the court. They offered horses, invaluable for China, and received silk and paper money that they could use to purchase other products. An envoy from western Central Asia who passed through Turfan observed that the town “had large idol-temples of superb beauty inside which there were many idols, some of them having been made newly and others old. In foreground of the platform there was a big image which was asserted by them to be the statue of Sakyamuni."^[274]

Relations with both Hami and Turfan began to sour after the capture of the Ming emperor in 1449. The rulers of Turfan adopted a more strident policy towards the Ming and sought to annex Hami and additional territories in eastern Central Asia. Their and their subjects' conversions to Islam may have also contributed to their unwillingness to accept a tributary status to China. The Ming army had clearly deteriorated, the court faced revenue shortfalls and powerful eunuchs, on occasion, dominated the government. The rulers of Turfan recognized these problems, all of which facilitated Turfan's challenge to Chinese hegemony. Commercial disputes first ensnarled relations, as the Ming complained about the quality of horses sent by Turfan and the large number of men on each so-called tribute mission, all of whose expenses in China were borne by the court.

Capitalizing on China's declining influence in neighboring areas and antagonized by the Ming court's limits on tribute and commerce, Turfan adopted an increasingly bellicose policy. In 1473, its ruler Sultan ‘All occupied Hami, and almost a decade elapsed before the Ming liberated this gateway to the so-called Western Regions.¹¹ For the next three decades, Turfan and China vied for control over Hami. In 1482, the Ming court supported a Uyghur leader to recapture Hami, but seven years later, Sultan ‘All's son Ahmad killed the Uyghur governor and reoccupied Hami. The Ming court retaliated by denying entry to Turfan's trade and tribute missions. Ahmad responded by submitting and withdrawing his troops from Hami. This initial Ming success was, in large part, based upon the development and recruit­ment of a coterie of foreign experts who recognized that commerce was vital for Turfan. Ma Wensheng, the Minister of War, had been stationed as an official in northwest China and was the principal proponent of the policy of rejecting trade with Turfan as a means of undermining what the Chinese conceived of as belligerence.^[277] XuJin, who was governor of Gansu province and had spent most of his career in northwest China, led a campaign to oust Turfan from Hami and neighboring oases.1^[278] As early as the Yongle reign, the court had established a College of Interpreters and a College of Translators to train interpreters and translators in languages spoken in nearby regions. Although both agencies were flawed, they provided the court with a few qualified men who knew foreign languages.^[279]

Despite such expertise, the Ming dynasty ultimately did not have the resources to protect Hami and to deter challenges. It received a brief respite when Ahmad responded to a plea from his brother, who governed the western regions of their domains, to defend his lands against the expansionist Uzbek Turks. In 1505, Ahmad traveled westward to assist his brother, but shortly thereafter he was captured and died in captivity. His son Mansur was not to be deterred.^[280] In 1513, he conquered Hami, and this time the Ming could not mount a campaign to oust Turfan.^[281] Four years later, Mansur occupied Shazhou, an oasis even closer to China. At this point, the Ming relented and allowed Turfan to dispatch trade and tribute embassies to China. A steady flow of such missions, which were intent on trade rather than diplomacy, reached the court throughout the sixteenth century, and commerce along the frontiers persisted.^[282] The Ming dynasty had become, in Wang Gungwu’s words, a “lesser empire” in eastern Central Asia, unable to enforce its will on its neighbors to the northwest.^[283]

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Timurids in Central Asia

Farther away from China but lying at the center of the Timurid Empire was western Central Asia. In the last third of the fourteenth century, Temur had occupied a vast domain, including western Central Asia, Iran, parts of West Asia, northern India and the Caucasus, and had established his capital in Samarkand, the heart of Central Asia. He actually conquered more territory than Chinggis Khan had, but never assumed the title “Khan” because he was not directly descended from Chinggis. In the last decade of the fourteenth century, he received Chinese embassies with letters from the Chinese emperor that addressed him as a vassal. Taking umbrage at such disrespect and having heard rumors that the Ming mistreated the Muslims in China, he determined to avenge his Islamic brothers and planned a military campaign against China.¹⁹ While heading towards China, he died of natural causes in February 1405. His death was a blessing for China, as the Ming dynasty had not made any preparations to defend its realm. Indeed, the Chinese scarcely knew about Temur and were unaware that he planned to invade China.

Temur's death generated the same succession struggles that plagued many states with a nomadic and decentralized origin. He had based his power, in part, on the personal loyalty of leaders throughout his domains. His appoint­ment of his own sons and grandsons as rulers of his lands further assured him of stable control. However, his death released these individuals from their obligations and permitted some of them to fight to replace him. Four years of intermittent conflict elapsed before Shah Rukh, one of Temur's sons, vanquished his opponents and became the new ruler. Although Shah Rukh emerged victorious, he governed a diminished empire. Many local governors had capitalized on the chaos attending the succession to assert their auton­omy. The Timurid Empire had been weakened. Shah Rukh's father had assigned him to rule Khurasan from Herat, and after his victory, he ruled from there and placed Ulugh Beg, his own son, in charge of Samarkand, Temur's capital. Although he tried to recover some of the territories that had been lost, he was unable to restore control over key areas, including Azerbaijan and Iraq. He maintained jurisdiction principally in Central Asia and Iran. Like his father, he recruited Iranian officials to assist him in ruling,

1 ⁹ Joseph Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368-1884” in John Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese Weirld Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 209-10. but relied mostly on Turkic peoples for his military forces. For a time, this reliance on the Turco-Mongolian system of jasagh law and the Iranian shari'a law worked out, but this dichotomy eventually proved to be troublesome because it created a split between the Iranians, who associated with seden­tary civilizations and Islamic law, and the Turks, who identified with the traditional nomadic culture, values and law.^[284] Individual rivalries among governors compelled Shah Rukh to engage in military campaigns to pacify opponents, which actually weakened his state. Lacking his father's military talents, he turned to diplomacy, occasionally with great success. For example, he abandoned his father's Eastern campaign and instead established a stable relationship with Ming China. The Chinese sent an official named Chen Cheng to improve relations, and Chen produced an excellent account of fifteenth-century Herat.^[285] In turn, Shah Rukh's envoy to China wrote a lengthy description of the Ming at its height.^[286] These exchanges led to a resumption of trade between the two empires through the early sixteenth century.

Despite the political infighting and progressively unstable political situ­ation, Shah Rukh in Herat and Ulugh Beg in Samarkand fostered a cultural and artistic renaissance in the Timurid domains. Even earlier, Temur and his family had constructed imposing buildings, often related to their Islamic faith, in Samarkand. His sisters built mausolea with exquisite tile mosaics, but the most renowned structure was the unique ribbed dome Gur-I Mir, with tombs for Temur himself and his grandson Ulugh Beg. Temur's construction of the Mosque of Bibi Khanum was another indication of his devotion to Islam. Gauhar Shad, Shah Rukh's wife, was a patron of archi­tecture in his capital at Herat. A mosque, a madrassah, a shrine and her own mausoleum, adorned with spectacular tile work, attest to her patronage^[287]. Few Timurid carpets have survived, although some specialists believe that several types of carpets currently attributed to a later period date from the fifteenth century.

The Timurid rulers and the merchants who prospered from the continu­ance of trade also subsidized a variety of other arts and crafts.^[288] The Herat school of artists was famous for its miniatures for manuscripts. Shah Rukh commissioned Hafiz-i Abru to continue Rashid al-Din's great universal history, and the resulting work offered numerous images. The Khalila wa Dimna,^[289] a book consisting of animal fables, was another illustrated text, and the Herat school continued to produce outstanding miniatures throughout the Timurid reign. The Timurids also supported metalwork and showed a fondness for Chinese porcelains, commissioning potters who attempted to provide acceptable copies. Trade with China led to the development of a considerable collection of Ming dynasty blue-and-white porcelains, some of which wound up in Ardebil in Iran.^[290] Religious objects such as prayer stands for the Koran, as well as other artifacts, also received considerable patronage. Husain Baiqara (r. 1470 to 1506), a Timurid descendant based in Herat, was a patron of the literary arts.^[291] Poetry, sometimes imbued with Sufi mystical connotations, blossomed during his reign. ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami (1414 to 1492) was a particularly renowned Iranian poet of that era. Husain Baiqara sup­ported the construction of such spectacular architectural monuments as madrassahs, mosques, caravanserais and hospitals. Similarly, historians and biographers, sometimes of religious figures, also received patronage.

Shah Rukh retained power, escaping an attempt at assassination in 1427, and maintained a semblance of order until the end of his reign in 1447. Like so many nomadic-based empires, succession to leadership was often a problem. Shah Rukh's son Ulugh Beg initially appeared to be victorious after his father's death, but he faced opposition.^[292] His own son defected, defeated his father's forces and had him killed in 1449. In his four decades as a governor, Ulugh Beg contributed to cultural efflorescence in Samarkand. Like his grand­father Temur, he added to the city's architectural splendor. His fame rests on his construction of an observatory, as well as his own writings on astron­omy. His political and military skills lagged behind, however, preventing him from gaining control over and unifying his ancestors' domains.

His death unleashed still another struggle for succession, with two rulers coming to power and each being killed. Finally, in 1451, Abu Said, Temur's great grandson, took power for almost two decades, but he governed over a much lesser empire. Many of the West Asian domains subjugated by Temur, including western Iran, had broken away. Abu Said faced opposition within his own princely family and also from Turkmen and Uzbek leaders in the region, and in 1469 succumbed to one of his Turkmen enemies.^[293] Subsequent Timurid leaders continued to lose ground, especially to the Uzbeks, until the accession of Babur (b. 1483).^[294] Later the founder of the Mughal dynasty of India, Babur tried to retain his ancestors' territory, especially the Timurid capital of Samarkand, but a defeat to the Uzbeks in Herat in 1506 compelled him eventually to migrate. The Uzbek leader Muhammad Shaibani allowed Babur to depart for Kabul. Although Babur tried, for a time, to reclaim his ancestral lands, he eventually abandoned his efforts, and in 1526 decisively changed course by attacking and occupying Delhi.

Instability gave rise to considerable religious fervor, as Sufism, in particu­lar, gained adherents. Its mysticism appealed initially to the lower classes, who often bore the brunt of the violence and destruction that characterized the turbulence of some of the Timurid reigns. The poor turned to sheikhs, who offered the promise of inner spiritual peace, to cope with chaotic conditions. Veneration of saints, asceticism, fear of God, vocalization of prayers and whirling movements that could lead to union with the divine were all means of achieving a calmer state. People of all classes came to seek solace via Sufism. Merchants, in particular, became effective vehicles for transmitting the Sufi message throughout Central Asia.

Like the Mongols, Temur and his descendants have been portrayed as barbaric devastators of the economies and cultures of the regions they subjugated. This chapter has already challenged such perceptions by pointing to their contributions to the arts, architecture and sciences. The concept of economic devastation also needs to be questioned. The original conquests in Central Asia and Iran proved damaging, but the Timurids quickly initiated policies to ensure the recovery of these domains. They fostered commerce by constructing roads, rebuilding sections of cities that had been damaged and offering reductions in taxes to merchants. Although the pace of com­mercial activity diminished from the halcyon days of the Mongol Empire, trade persisted with areas as far away as China in the east and Anatolia in the west.³¹ The Timurids moved expeditiously to restore agriculture near the oases and towns, in particular repairing the complicated and essential irrigation systems that had been damaged during the warfare. Political and military instability, succession disputes and conflicts with the Turkmen and Uzbeks vitiated these remarkable economic achievements, weakening the Timurids and making them vulnerable to the previously nomadic Uzbeks, who became the dominant force in Central Asia from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century.

Uzbek dominance

Allegedly descended from Ozbeg Khan (r. 1313 to 1341), a ruler of the Golden Horde who had converted to Islam, the Uzbeks resided in the Central Asian grasslands and pursued a nomadic pastoral economy in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Abul Khayr Khan united the disparate Uzbek groups, composed of ninety-two tribes, between 1428 and 1468. His attempts at expansion resulted in conflicts with the Timurids, the Golden Horde, Iran and the Western or Oyirad Mongols. Yet, such conflicts contributed to a growing identity of the Uzbeks as a distinct group. Although the Uzbeks were often divided by internal struggles and wars, they persisted in perceiv­ing themselves to be of the same origin.

Muhammad Shaibani (1451 to 1510), Abul Khayr Khan's grandson, led the Uzbeks into greater territorial expansion. Reared in the steppelands rather than in the Central Asian cities, he developed a profound attachment to his

³¹ Morris Rossabi, “The ‘Decline' of the Central Asian Caravan Trade” in James Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 351-71. beautiful land and its flora and fauna.^[295] He also benefited from a stay in Bukhara, where he was exposed to learned Sufis and became a devotee of the arts. Despite these religious and cultural interests, he was also a strong military leader, whose ventures led to the destruction of the Timurids and annexation of their lands in Central Asia. By the end of the first decade of the sixteenth century, he had overrun the Timurid domains and became the most important ruler in Central Asia. Despite his victory, however, the break-up of the Timurids led to the independence and establishment of the Safavid dynasty in Iran and its support for Shiite Islam. Religious disputes, as well as diplomatic and political rivalry, caused a rift between these two areas that had been part of the Timurid domains.

The Uzbeks began to settle in cities and to engage in trade and self­sufficient farming, but were plagued by internal conflicts. Shaibani's descend­ants established a capital city in Bukhara, later known as an emirate, and fostered commerce. Trade along the traditional Silk Roads, which centered on China and Iran, diminished, and new trading partners developed. Tsarist Russia and Mughal India would generally replace Iran and China as the Uzbeks' principal foreign relationships. Yet, despite their commercial successes, the Uzbeks' internal fragmentation permitted the Ashtarkhanids (1599 to 1785), supported by Sufi leaders, to overwhelm the Shaibanids, and then similarly the Manghits (1753 to 1920) defeated the Ashtarkhanids after an Iranian invasion had weakened them. Other Uzbek groups broke away and founded Khanates in Khiva (1511 to the late seventeenth century and 1770 to 1920) and Khoqand (1798 to 1876).

Uzbek political instability did not undermine trade, often the lifeblood of Central Asian history. The ruling dynasties were not averse to commerce, even with such former enemies as the Timurids, whose descendants ruled as India's Mughal dynasty.^[296] Uzbeks had expelled the Timurids from Central Asia in the early sixteenth century, but within several decades had developed a thriving trading relationship with the Mughals. Their common religion of Islam facilitated a renewal of contacts, but it was often Indian Hindus who promoted and served as middlemen in this commerce. The mostly Muslim population did not perceive the Hindus favorably, but recognized that they fostered trade, offered loans to Uzbek merchants, and supported the govern­ment in its efforts to devise and collect taxes in cash. Hindu merchants transported cotton textiles, slaves, sugar, spices, herbs and jewelry, among other products, to the Uzbeks and obtained horses, furs and slaves.^[297]

Safavid-Uzbek hostilities, especially over northeast Iran or Khurasan, persisted, but India now began to play an important role in Central Asia. Nonetheless, commerce persisted in western Central Asia in the seven­teenth and early eighteenth centuries, but with new partners, India and then Russia—not China.

The last Mongol Empire

In eastern Central Asia, although the Silk Roads had declined after the mid-sixteenth century, a new commercial interchange with China developed in the seventeenth century. Before its restoration, however, threats arose from the nomadic Kazakh and Kyrgyz peoples to the oases and towns of the Tarim River basin. In the seventeenth century, a new movement around the Sufi Naqshbandi order, which approved of political involvement, gained control over the region and finally supplanted the descendants of the Chaghadai rulers.^[298] Shortly thereafter, the Naqshbandi leadership split into a White Mountain group and a Black Mountain group and became embroiled in violent battles, making them vulnerable to Galdan Khan, who unified the Zunghar or western Mongols and swept into the Tarim basin in 1678 to 1680. After their withdrawal from China in 1368, the Mongols had been unable to achieve unity, despite the bonds created by their conversion to Tibetan Buddhism in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Galdan, with the Dalai Lama's implicit support, initiated the last Mongol effort to create a nomadic empire.

Earlier, Galdan had been studying in Tibet when he learned of a coup and the assassination of his brother, the leader of the Zunghars. Returning to Mongolia in 1671, he defeated his rivals and continued to build up the Zunghars' power.^[299] A few of these Mongols had begun to farm, others started to mine natural resources, and still others made their own weapons and manufactured articles. Zaya Pandita, a renowned advocate of Tibetan Buddhism, developed a new written script. Seeking to capitalize on these economic and cultural advances, Galdan began to challenge the Manchu-led Qing dynasty of China, which had ousted the Ming dynasty in 1644. Earlier, in 1640 and 1660, representatives of the leading Mongol groups had met to create a coalition, but unity had proven elusive. Neither the Khalkha, or Eastern Mongols, nor the Bogd Gegen, the spiritual heads of the Mongolian Buddhists, joined Galdan, and the Khalkha themselves were divided into at least four warring Khanates. Galdan took the bold and decisive step of attacking one of the Khanates, but was unable to secure much support from the others. Without Mongol unity, Galdan could not be assured of success against the Qing.^[300] The conflict between him and the Qing revolved around commercial disputes, and his occupation of the Tarim River basin in 1678 to 1680 derived, in part, from these conflicts.

This struggle shortly became global. Russia, which had crossed the Ural Mountains and colonized Siberia, began to encroach upon the Qing's northeastern frontiers in the middle of the seventeenth century. Diplomacy did not initially resolve their differing territorial claims, leading to a potential Russian-Zunghar alliance. From the early seventeenth century, the Russians and the Zunghars had exchanged diplomatic and commercial missions.^[301] But the Qing and the Tsarist courts pulled back from a confrontation because they had complementary interests. Russia wished to trade for Chinese tea, silk, porcelain and rhubarb, and the Qing wanted the Russians to withdraw from China's frontier areas and to devise a boundary that favored China's interests. The Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 contained such provisions, ending the dispute between the two great empires. Russia was permitted to send trade caravans to Beijing, and the border demarcation suited China.^[302] Bereft of allies and surrounded by the two empires, Galdan could no longer avoid a conflict with the Qing by fleeing into the steppes or Siberia. In 1691, the Khalkha Mongols further bolstered the Qing by accepting its sovereignty, ending Galdan's hopes for a Mongolian confederation under his leadership. In 1696, Qing armies caught up with and defeated Galdan. His nephew Tsewang Rabdan, who had earlier rebelled against his uncle, managed to escape and headed for the Tarim River basin, where he posed a threat to the oases and towns of eastern Central Asia. In 1717, he even conceived of a greater enterprise and dispatched an army on a successful foray to occupy Tibet. However, in 1720, the Qing, still concerned about a Mongol force not far away, sent a force that overcame logistical and transport problems to expel the Zunghars from that Himalayan country and to impose its own rule. Although it faced resistance from a variety of different Tibetan and Mongolian groups, it established a precarious peace in Tibet by the late 1720s.^[303]

Meanwhile, Qing commanders still sought to drive the Zunghars out of eastern Central Asia. A campaign in the northwest required a supply line and proper logistics. The Qing learned this via an abortive effort against the Zunghars in the area in 1731. Its forces lost, in large part, because the oases had meager supplies for a substantial army. When the Qianlong emperor took power in 1736, no decision had been made about a campaign towards eastern Central Asia, but divisions among the Zunghars, a common problem among the nomadic pastoral empires, gave the Qing an opening. The Qing authorities started by demanding funds, considerable supplies and recruits from the Khalkha Mongols, while the Zunghars sought assistance from Russia and the nomadic Kazakhs. Under great pressure, the Khalkha pro­vided help, but the tremendous burdens imposed upon them provoked a violent outbreak led by Chingunjav, a descendant of Chinggis Khan, in 1756. Qing troops quickly crushed his forces and accused the Bogd Gegen, the Buddhist religious leader, of supporting Chingunjav. The Qing court, fearful of a nationalist alliance between a Mongol secular commander and the Buddhist leader, now mandated that all future Bogd Gegens be Tibetan. Once the court had suppressed Chingtinjav''s rebellion, it could rely on some Mongols to assist in its most difficult and dramatic campaign, the defeat of the Zunghars in the northwest.^[304]

In the 1750s, Qing commanders added to the territories under the dynasty's control. In 1755, they crushed one Zunghar leader, but then faced Amursana, still another adversary, for another couple of years. Amursana gained support from the Kazakhs, but could not unite his own Zunghar people. Unaware of his difficulties in building up a powerful force, the Qing court ordered its commanders to show no mercy in wiping out the Zun- ghars. Such instructions emboldened the Qing military, leading both sides to engage in horrific massacres. Amursana himself successfully evaded the Qing, but eventually succumbed instead to smallpox while seeking Russian support. The Zunghars then disappeared as a group from historical accounts. Many were killed in battle, and some died of smallpox or other diseases. Yet, some also eluded the enemy, crossed into Russian territory and intermarried with Mongol groups who had moved there previously. They assumed the identities of the groups to which they became linked. Thus, the conception that the Qing massacred all of the Zunghars needs to be modified.⁴²

Qing occupation of eastern Central Asia

Once the Zunghars had been ousted from the northwest, the Qing still needed to overwhelm the Muslim communities to gain control of the region. Khojas, the religious leaders, posed a threat because of their desire to return to a form of Islam untainted by foreign influences. In effect, their views dictated autonomy or independence. Qing troops who had reached this distant region were determined to occupy the oases in the northwest. By 1760, they had pacified the principal oases of what eventually came to be called Xinjiang. By venturing into the northwest and subjugating and seeking to occupy a vast territory inhabited by a non-Chinese population, the Qing controverted traditional Chinese foreign policy and the advice of many emperors of the past. This new policy aroused considerable opposition from Chinese officials at the court who feared the consequences of such an occupation. They regarded these new lands, which consisted of sizeable deserts and barren terrain, as economically unproductive and as a burden

Shifting Communities and Identity Formation in Early Modern Asia (Leiden: Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, Universiteit Leiden, 2003), pp. 56-60.

⁴² The most important work on this struggle between the Qing and the Zunghars is Peter Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For a different approach, see L. I. Duman, “The Qing Conquest of Junggariye and Eastern Turkestan” in S. L. Tikhvinsky (ed.), Manzhou Rule in China, David Skvirsky (trans.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), pp. 237-9. on the army that was required to secure a region with a mostly non­Chinese population. Many of the non-Chinese were restive and strongly opposed to Qing rule, which had to maintain a military force along the frontiers.

The stationing of troops so far from China's center necessitated vast expenditures unless other practices or policies were developed. The Qing turned to the traditional system of military colonies (tuntian) to defray expenses. The colonists were expected to support themselves while main­taining their military skills. However, they inhabited marginal agrarian lands in the northwest and could not always be self-sufficient.^[305] As an occupation force, they were vulnerable to attacks. The court also planned to encourage them to help sinicize the local peoples, another burden on them. Still another obligation was the taxes on the surpluses they produced. Disgraced officials, exiled criminals, and other Chinese and Manchus in the northwest did not prove to be effective cultivators of the land, especially under the difficult conditions in the region.^[306] The Manchu armies had so-called Banners, admin­istrative divisions of soldiers that were each represented by a different color. Banner soldiers stationed in the northwest were not required to farm, and yet they had to be supplied. The Qing court also moved Muslim inhabitants from southern Xinjiang to the north to cultivate the land. All of these efforts prevented famine, but supplying the military and local residents was burdensome. The court's attempts to develop an iron industry to fashion agricultural implements for the farmers were only partially successful, and corruption further ensnarled its policies in the northwest.

Despite these difficulties, the court continued to claim domination over Xinjiang. It commissioned the production of maps, the creation and erection of stelae, and the writing of official histories to back up these claims. It used these tangible artifacts to legitimize its claims to control over Xinjiang.

Governance remained in the hands of the local rulers as long as they provided the required taxes and other services. The native leaders, especially those who had cooperated with the Qing, were granted responsibility for security, collection of taxes and legal affairs, while under the supervision of Manchu ambans or governors. Known as begs, these Muslim leaders had considerable autonomy if they submitted taxes to the court and maintained

the peace.^[307] The Qing allowed the local authorities wide latitude and did not impose Chinese law on them. The begs and qadis, or jurists, used shar‘ia law to resolve disputes and to punish criminals. The Qing also did not seek to promote Confucianism or Buddhism in the region. In short, it did not attempt to sinicize the local inhabitants by compelling the use of Chinese language or other practices of Chinese civilization. The Manchu and Mongol Banner troops, who were stationed in northern Xinjiang and had abundant grass for their animals, abided by military rules. The Chinese in the area and some of the most reliable native inhabitants were considered to be part of the regular government structure, basically a province.

The court sought to promote economic development in these new territories, but the native inhabitants may not have gained as much as outsiders, specifically Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs. The govern­ment's central motivation in its efforts to foster economic growth was to supply the military forces meant to maintain Qing control over the region. Because of its inability to provide enough resources for its troops, it had to transmit considerable quantities of silver to meet the military's basic needs. In attempting to reduce expenses, Qing officials tapped the region's natural resources, collected fine quality jade from the traditional center of Khotan, set up shops, transported tea to Xinjiang and facilitated the travels of merchants, mostly Chinese but with a sprinkling of Indians and Muslims, to this relatively remote region.^[308] Profits from these economic policies frequently accrued to Chinese merchants, who also “rewarded” officials, and to the begs and a few leaders in the Muslim communities. The native peoples did not gain as much from this economic growth, and as a result the Chinese and Muslim elites earned their wrath and enmity. Moreover, even these dramatic policies did not secure sufficient funds to subsidize the military stationed in Xinjiang.

The colonial occupation, the anti-Muslim policies of some Qing officials, the Chinese merchants' exploitation of the native inhabitants and the frequently poor quality of officials generated hostility towards the occu­piers. An area that had been autonomous had now fallen under foreign and, in particular, non-Muslim outsider control. Muslim orders such as the Naqshbandiyya, a Sufi mystical group that emphasized a silent remem­brance of God (dhkir) and sought to revert to the original form of Islam, arose in opposition to Qing rule. Foreign control was unacceptable for an order that did not wish to be polluted by foreign practices and beliefs. A few exchanges with Muslim religious leaders in West and Central Asia further stimulated these orders and their Khojas to break away from China. Promulgating a so-called New Teaching (xinjiao) version of Islam, the Naqshbanddiya leaders who took an active role in secular life fostered growing dissatisfaction with Qing domination.^[309]

Their responses would ultimately lead to violence, although animosity developed slowly. Economic, ethnic and religious factors contributed to these conflicts. Some years elapsed before these fissures translated into violent outbreak that would wrack the Qing Empire. Nonetheless, a rebellion erupted in 1765, and Ma Mingxin, a Muslim leader who had studied in West Asia, led a revolt from 1781 to 1784. The Qing rapidly crushed these rebellions. Yet, the stage was set for further confrontations. As the Qing declined in the nineteenth century and faced even greater threats from Western countries along its east coast, dissidents in the northwest would capitalize on China's weakness to gain independence. But China's problems would also prompt Western countries to challenge its domination in the northwest. Great Britain and especially Russia would be the main threats to Qing hegemony in Xinjiang.

Tsarist court and Central Asia

Tensions and disputes involving Britain and Russia did not simply involve Xinjiang, but all of Central Asia in a competition for supremacy that became known in the nineteenth century as the Great Game. Great Britain sought to protect its base in India and, for that matter, its economic interests in China, while Russia attempted to annex additional Central Asian territories adjacent to its Siberian domains. The two powers had diametrically opposed interests, and their initiatives and policies would return Central Asia to the seminal role it had played when the Silk Roads were at their height of importance. Developments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Central Asia set the stage for its re-emergence as a vital area in global interactions.

Even before the onset of full-scale Russo-British rivalry, the Tsarist court had started to secure leverage over neighboring Central Asian regions. It focused first on the pastoral nomads, whose mobility posed obstacles in controlling them. Yet, these leaders of the Kazakh peoples were not as numerous as the dwellers in the Central Asian towns and cities, and they were divided into three confederations. Because these Kazakhs lacked unity, they were more vulnerable to Russian pressure. By the sixteenth century, they had overwhelmed the remaining Chinggisid rulers and had converted to Islam, incorporating the Khojas and their Sufi rituals around saints' tombs and shrines. At the same time, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Kazakhs had fought against the Uzbeks, a struggle that weakened both sides. The Junior Kazakhs, one of three confederations, had suffered to such an extent that they sought Russian protection and submitted to the Tsarist court in 1730.^[310] Their leaders retained the title “Khan” until 1824, when the Russians became totally dominant and eliminated the desig­nation. The Middle Kazakhs were more independent and only after the death of Ablay Khan, a strong and charismatic ruler, in 1782 did the Tsarist court gain control over the group. The Senior Kazakhs remained independent until the middle of the nineteenth century, when a Russian military cam­paign caused them to fall to the Tsarist court.

Once it exerted its power over two of the three Kazakh confederations, the Tsarist court moved expeditiously to govern these regions. It first limited the herders' migrations, commanding them to use specific lands in their movements. By restricting mobility, Russia would, in theory, be able more readily to supervise the Kazakhs. The Tsarist court also supported Islam as a means of control. Mosques, madrassas and saints' tombs would be constructed in towns or cities, contributing further to efforts to settle the Kazakhs in a permanent location rather than having them roam around the grasslands. The court then fostered trade with the Kazakhs, with the Russians offering grain and manufactured articles in return for horses, sheep, goats and animal products. Such commerce would foster greater integration into Russia, the court's principal objective. Finally, Tsarist officials both coerced and encouraged Cossacks, Muslims from other regions and Russians to settle in the Kazakh lands, an additional attempt to bring these territories into the Russian fold.^[311]

The instability of the sedentary Uzbek Khanates also provided opportun­ities for the Tsarist court. By the early seventeenth century, Uzbek rulers had established Khanates in Khiva and Bukhara, and Bukharan merchants, who served as intermediaries in trade with India, Russia and China, had prospered from their vital positions along the major Asian trade routes. Despite these commercial successes, however, the two Khanates were polit­ically vulnerable, partly due to foreign enemies and partly due to their own lack of unity and to conflicts about proper succession to rulership. Assassin­ations of Khans, invasions by foreign countries and attacks from steppe nomads contributed to the weaknesses of the Khanates and ultimately facilitated Russian conquest in the nineteenth century.

The steady deterioration of the Khanates' power began in the early eight­eenth century. Khiva, the first to face chaotic conditions, was plagued by Turkmen and Kazakh attacks, and even disaffected and principally nomadic Uzbeks raided their ethnic brothers' lands in the town. Such repeated violence undermined Khiva's stability. Bukhara confronted similar difficulties. Nomadic Turkmen and Kazakhs repeatedly attacked Bukhara or the adjacent territories controlled by it, and its ruling families themselves harmed the town by assassinations and struggles for power. As a result of this violence, Bukhara became vulnerable, culminating in the Iranian Safavid ruler Nadir Shah's invasion and occupation in 1740. Khiva also fell to the Safavids, and both towns were compelled to provide tribute of grain and fodder and to contribute soldiers to Nadir Shah's forces. Iran had some influence over the two towns until the Safavids themselves were beset by turmoil. Nadir Shah chose members of the Manghit tribe of the Uzbeks to rule Khiva and Bukhara, and offered them considerable autonomy. However, in 1747, Nadir Shah was assassinated, leading to further turbulence among the Safavids. At the same time, his death allowed dissident Uzbeks who resented Iranian influence to challenge what had become the Manghit dynasty. Warring Uzbek forces continued to threaten the dynasty in Bukhara throughout the eighteenth century. The Mangits engaged in wars and raids against Merv in Iran and Afghan territories. Although the Mangits maintained support of Islam, including construction of mosques and patronage of waqfs, or pious endowments, the repeated defen­sive and offensive military campaigns sapped the dynasty's strength and made it vulnerable to Russian expansion in the nineteenth century.^[312]

The Mangit dynasty in Khiva encountered similar instability. Turkmen, Kazakh and Uzbek groups repeatedly challenged the dynasty's control, and a Kazakh Khan briefly occupied the town from 1753 to 1758. Assassinations, oppressive rule and squabbles among the Mangit rulers harmed efforts to establish a stable government. By the early nineteenth century, political chaos had a devastating impact, once again permitting the Russians to gain leverage and then control over the town.

In the late eighteenth century, the Uzbeks founded the Kokand Khanate, the last of these Central Asian states in this era. Based in the fertile Ferghana valley, it had optimal conditions for a prosperous society. Yet, after the reign of Norbuti Biy (1770 to 1798), it fragmented into the same disunity that had characterized Bukhara and Khiva. Unity proved elusive.⁵¹ Part of the difficulties faced by the Khanates arose from increasing dependence on Russia for trade. After the sixteenth century, they had limited contact with China, and by the late eighteenth century commerce with India also decreased. Such major towns as Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent, which had flourished in the past through trade and had been centers of astronomy, mathematics and the arts, now engaged in less commerce, produced fewer cultural and scientific innov­ations, and began to decline. Their militaries did not develop the weapons available to the Russians in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Their lack of unity and their inferior weapons were no match for Russia.

Conclusions

Although Central Asia appeared to be less central to global history from 1400 to 1800, it continued to be a crossroads, with links to numerous states across all of Asia. After Tamerlane's death and the eventual accession of his son Shahrukh in 1409, the Timurid Empire resumed relations with China. Oases neighboring China such as Turfan and Hami permitted the conduct of trade with the Ming dynasty. In western Central Asia, the Timurids in the fifteenth century and the Uzbek Khanate from the sixteenth century onwards enjoyed extensive trade relations with India and, subsequently, Russia. The Moghuls of India, descendants of the Timurids, and their Hindu subjects had Central Asian roots and maintained a trade in horses, grain and manu­factured articles with the Uzbeks. After crossing the Urals in the late sixteenth century, Russia became an Asian power. The Tsarist court began to trade for wild rhubarb found in northwest China and eastern Central Asia. At the same time, its merchants sought to obtain products from the Kazakhs, Turkmen and Uzbeks in western Central Asia.

⁵¹ See LauraJ. Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: A Pohtieal History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, c. 1760-1860 (Leiden: Brill, 2005) for Khoqand's relations with China.

However, by the eighteenth century, Central Asian powers had weakened as a result of their disunity. The local Turkic leaders resented the Zunghars, who had moved into eastern Central Asia and did not unite with them against China's dynasty when it sent forces to crush the Mongols. Facing a weak opposition, the Qing incorporated eastern Central Asia as part of its domains. Similarly, western Central Asia, consisting of a variety of peoples, including the Kazakhs, Turkmen and Kazakhs, lacked unity. In fact, they often fought amongst each other. By the end of the eighteenth century, two of the three Kazakh groups had become virtual dependencies of Russia, and the three Uzbek Khanates were in disarray. As the nineteenth century wore on, the Khanates fell to Russian onslaughts. The obvious desire of the Tsarist and Qing courts to annex different areas of Central Asia, and the considerable resources they expended in these efforts, confirm the region's value and significance. Through its links with Russia and China, Central Asia remained part of global history.

The growing Islamization of Central Asia during this era also contributed to its importance. Eastern Central Asia still had Buddhist monasteries in the fifteenth century. Within a hundred years, a vast majority of the popula­tion was Muslim. In western Central Asia, Sufi Khojas played increasingly significant secular and religious roles. The Uzbeks in the west followed the same trajectory as in the east, as they gradually converted to Islam over several centuries from 1500 to 1800. The Uzbek Khanates constructed mosques and madrassas and established waqfs, which ultimately contributed to increased urbanization. The Kazakhs turned to Islam even more slowly, as conversions of pastoral nomads were not as rapid as those of town dwellers. Nonetheless, by 1800, most of the Kazakh herders identified with Islam. The conversions of most Central Asians to Islam put them in touch with the world's Muslim community, especially in West Asia and the Indian subcontinent. These connections were another way in which Central Asia was linked into larger patterns of global history.

FURTHER READING

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Allen, Terry, Timurid Herat (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1983).

Allworth, Edward, The Modern Uzbeks From the 14th Century to the Present: A Cultural History (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1990).

Barthold, Vasilli V., Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, V. Minorsky and T. Minorsky (trans.), 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1956-62).

Bawden, Charles, The Modern History of Mongolia (New York: Frederic Praeger, 1968).

Burton, Audrey, The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic, and Commercial History, 1550-1702 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

Cosmo, Nicola Di, Allen Frank and Peter Golden (eds.), The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Era (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Dabringhaus, Sabine and Roderick Ptak (eds.), China and Her Neighbours (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997).

Dale, Stephen, Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600-1750 (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Elverskog, Johan, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

Foltz, Richard, Mughal India and Central Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). Gommans, Jos, The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire, c. 1710-1780 (Leiden: Brill, 1995). Hambly, Gavin, Central Asia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).

Kauz, Ralph, Politik und Handel zwischen Ming und Timuriden: China, Iran, and Zentralasien im Spatmittelalter (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2005).

Khodarkovsky, Michael, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002).

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Levi, Scott, The Indian Diaspora in CentralAsia and Its Trade, 1550-1900 (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

Mancall, Mark, China and Russia: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

Manz, Beatrice Forbes, Power, Politics, and Religion in Timurid Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

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McChesney, Robert, Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889 (Princeton University Press, 1991).

Millward, James, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia Univer­sity Press, 2007).

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