Far East, U.S.-German Entente in the

During the presidency of Theodore Roo­sevelt, the intensity of diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire reached a climax. A series of diplo­matic clashes taught the Germans not to underestimate U.S.

After the conference of Algeciras in 1906, which had amply demonstrated the utopian character of German American co­operation, Berlin’s disillusionment did not last long. Already in May of the same year, Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow had out­lined his conception of the future, empha­sizing the need to rely on Germany’s own power. Yet, he also named the Allies and potential friends that the empire had left. In this list the United States was promi­nently included. The perceived urgency of a rapprochement with the United States grew because of Germany’s increasing iso­lation or—speaking in the contemporary terminology—“encirclement.”

In 1907, the Far East was the region where Berlin’s diplomatic failures seemed to lead to dangerous developments. A whole series of agreements among major powers, like France and Japan, Russia and Japan, and finally even Great Britain and Russia with regard to China, in combina­tion with the existing alliances, made Ger­many’s containment seem complete. Due to the imminent end of the Manchu dy­nasty, the partition of China seemed more likely than ever before. In Berlin, the For­eign Office and Wilhelm II feared exclu­sion from the Chinese market and sought the help of the only power besides Ger­many that had not yet concluded an agree­ment, the United States.

Because of the diplomatic situation, German hopes were not completely un­founded. Economic rivalries in the after­math of the Russo-Japanese War had re­vealed deep tensions between the United States and Japan. Late in 1906, discrimi­nation against Japanese schoolchildren in San Francisco led to open protests by Tokyo. While Roosevelt was able to allay these tensions by an exchange of diplo­matic notes—the so-called gentleman’s agreement—the press continued to play on “yellow peril” notions.

From the German point of view, it was natural that Berlin should cooperate with Washington. Keeping the door open to allow trade with all countries had been the declared policy of the United States in China for several years. Now, in 1907, with its European competitors united against her, Germany sought to replace the United States in the Chinese question and announced that it worked for the same objective.

One of the measures to win U.S. sup­port was to try to arouse suspicion and fear against the other great powers. Thus, Wil­helm II in September 1905 wanted to palm off his favorite “yellow peril” picture, ac­companied by a frank letter about the topic, on Roosevelt. Yet, the German gov­ernment resolved to wait for an U.S. initia­tive for closer contacts.

By the end of 1906, when reports about the heightened possibility of a con­flict between the United States and Japan reached the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, such a U.S. initiative seemed likely. By the end of October, the embassy in Washing­ton reported that Roosevelt had brought up the topic of a probable war himself and had asked for some information on the Japanese navy. Roosevelt’s wish for data was fulfilled in early November, and Ambas­sador Hermann Speck von Sternburg was instructed to encourage the president’s mis­trust in a careful manner. In February 1907, Sternburg reported growing anti­Japanese feelings in the United States. He also stressed the fact that U.S. leaders sup­ported the conciliatory policy of the presi­dent because of the inferiority of the U.S.

New racial conflicts in San Francisco in May and the conclusion of the Franco- Japanese agreement in early June made an alliance with the United States even more likely. Indeed, public opinion in the United States as well as in Europe became more and more convinced that a war against Japan was inevitable. In addition, the Ger­man envoy in Beijing began to warn against the threat of Japanese expansion and suggested examining the possibility of cooperation with the United States, Russia, and China to prevent this eventuality.

In July, Germany informed Roosevelt about the substantial increase in Japanese immigration to Mexico. The reports specu­lated that Japan was moving troops into Mexico in order to be able to wage an ef­fective land war against the United States. President Roosevelt, however, thought the idea of a Japanese invasion via Mexico ab­surd. Nevertheless, Berlin succeeded in keeping Roosevelt’s distrust alive, and the president concluded that there was indeed a tendency toward war in Japan, but that it was no immediate threat.

Partly because of Sternburg’s personal approach to diplomacy with his friend Theodore Roosevelt and his distorting re­ports home, the impression of U.S. ner­vousness about Japanese policy in China remained alive in Berlin. Indeed, the am­bassador’s reports encouraged the German government to find out if the United States showed an interest in countering the Anglo-French-Japanese alliance in China. In autumn of 1907, a Chinese offer for co­operation with Germany arrived, and the Germans wanted to extend it to the United States. Indeed, the Germans had reason to

believe in the success of their diplomatic maneuvers. At the end of 1907, prepara­tions for the cruise of a U.S. battleship fleet around the world were in full swing. The cruise seemed to heighten the risk of war since the Japanese reaction was not easily predictable. But again the president ex­pressed his polite but firm reserve toward the German offers, and again Sternburg’s reports created a very different impression in Berlin.

Thus, although realizing that a formal alliance was impossible, German diplo­macy hoped for at least a joint declaration about the integrity of China. Even this symbolic cooperation became unlikely when tensions between Japan and the United States gradually subsided. By the summer of 1908, chances of reaching the desired agreement had almost vanished. A decisive factor for Roosevelt’s rejection of the German scheme was his desire to keep peace with Japan and reach an understand­ing with that country. In late November the Root-Takahira agreement between the United States and Japan was concluded. An exchange of notes guaranteed the mainte­nance of the status quo in the Pacific Ocean and support for the open door as well as the integrity of China. Hence, the United States had basically concluded the same type of agreement with Japan as Rus­sia and France had done earlier. Instead of cooperating with Germany against the rest of the world, Roosevelt had joined the camp of the opponents.

Stefan Rinke

See also Sternburg, Hermann Speck von;

Venezuelan Crisis

References and Further Reading

Esthus, Raymond A. Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries. Waltham: Regina Books, 1970.

Menning, Ralph R. The Collapse of “Global Diplomacy”: Germany’s Descent into Isolation, 1906—09. PhD diss., Brown University, 1986.

Pommerin, Reiner. Der Kaiser und Amerika: Die USA in der Politik der Reichsleitung, 1890—1917. Cologne: Bohlau, 1986.

Rinke, Stefan. “A Misperception of Reality: The Futile German Attempts to an Entente with the United States, 1907-08.” In Theodore Roosevelt: Many-Sided American. Ed. Natalie A. Naylor. Interlaken: Heart of the Lakes Press, 1992, 369-382.