First Moroccan Crisis (1905-1906)
German Weltpolitik (world politics) and U.S. expansionism brought a significant change to the relationship between Berlin and Washington at the turn of the twentieth century. The tradition of mutual sympathy gradually developed into a state of hostility.
During the Venezuelan crisis of 1902—1903, friction between Germany and the United States reached a climax. After 1903, changes in the international power constellation, such as the shaping of the entente cordiale between Great Britain and France, made Washington’s goodwill more valuable for the German government. During the First Moroccan Crisis in 1905—1906, which developed from Franco-German rivalries in North Africa, German foreign policy was to a large degree based upon the belief in U.S. support.Until 1900, Germany’s economic interest in Morocco had been negligible, and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck repeatedly confirmed that Germany did not have any special claim on that country. Hence, French influence was allowed to grow steadily. The Moroccan sultans became dependent on loans from Paris, which led to talks about the acceptance of French predominance in Morocco by France, Great Britain, and Spain in 1902—1903, culminating in the conclusion of the entente in 1904.
At this point, the German government gave up its traditional policy of noninvolvement in the matter and began to challenge French claims in Morocco. Berlin reacted to the demands of the pan-German Right and to the growing German economic interests in North Africa. In addition, Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow hoped to thwart the threatening Anglo- French alliance.
What Germany needed was a powerful backer, preferably one that could influence Great Britain. According to Bulow and his advisers, the cessation of English support would mean the breakdown of French policy. The United States seemed to be the ideal partner since it had shown interest in Morocco.
Moreover, with Ambassador Hermann Speck von Sternburg, Germany seemed to have a direct channel to the U.S. president. In the negotiations that followed, fueled by the diplomatic dispatches of Sternburg, wishful thinking rather than rational estimations about U.S. willingness to risk involvement in Morocco determined German foreign policy. The belief in the president’s support became the “keystone” of German plans.By the middle of 1905, the specter of a Franco-German war over Morocco was looming large after Wilhelm II had personally visited Tangier and thus emphasized German claims on Morocco. Although the North African country was not really important for Germany, what mattered was to show the French that Germany was a decisive power in global politics and one that could not simply be bypassed—not even with British support.
Under heavy diplomatic pressure, U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt finally agreed to mediate a conference with all powers involved in order to prevent a European war. Yet in spite of Berlin’s hopes, the president was determined to act as a neutral intermediary between the rivals. Roosevelt made it clear that he expected the Germans not to quibble over minor details. With the conference scheme secured, Ambassador Sternburg made the far-reaching commitment—presented in the form of a personal message from the emperor to the president—that Germany would be willing to back up Roosevelt’s decision in case of Franco-German differences.
The conference was scheduled to open in January 1906 in Algeciras. By that point, the German diplomatic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that the only aim of the German government now was to save face and avoid complete diplomatic isolation. Yet negotiations during the conference soon led to a deadlock because of the uncompromising French and German plans about how to reorganize the Moroccan police and financial systems. In February, when the whole conference threatened to fail and war seemed imminent, President Roosevelt reacted by using the former commitment of the German ambassador to force Germany into accepting the French proposal.
Essentially, the results of the conference showed the failure of German diplomacy. Although Moroccan sovereignty and equal rights for all trading interests were confirmed, the country soon came into the formal sphere of French influence. More important, however, was the strengthening of the entente cordiale and the initiation of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Algeciras had openly demonstrated German isolation for the first time, and the term encirclement gained more currency with the German public. International confer- ences—this seemed to be the lesson for Germany—were obviously not a good idea. German indignation with the United States was at most short lived. If only because of Germany’s growing isolation in Europe, the illusion of a cordial German American relationship and possibly even an alliance continued.
Stefan Rinke
See also Far East, U.S.-German Entente in the; Sternburg, Hermann Speck von; Venezuelan Crisis
References and Further Reading
Esthus, Raymond A. Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries. Waltham: Regina Books, 1970.
Larsen, Peter. “Theodore Roosevelt and the Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906.” PhD diss., Princeton University, 1984.
Rinke, Stefan. “A Diplomat’s Dilemma: Ambassador Speck von Sternburg and the Moroccan Crisis, 1905/06.” Mid-America 75, no. 2 (April-July 1993): 165-196.
Vagts, Alfred. Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik. New York: Macmillan, 1935.