U.S.-GDR Relations
During the cold war period, bilateral relations between the Unites States and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were mostly defined as “nonrelations.” Washington’s policy toward the East German state was frequently characterized as “nonpolicy.” From October 1949, when the GDR was proclaimed following the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in May of that year, until at least 1955, the United States perceived the East German state as an artificial, and temporary, entity governed by a Soviet “puppet regime.” The United States refrained from any direct contacts with the East Berlin government, communicating only indirectly through Soviet political and military authorities.
Until 1953 bureaucracies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, as well as the U.S. High Commissioner’s offices in West Germany, mostly toyed through strategic memoranda with psychological warfare to undermine the East German regime, guided by a vague hope of its eventual removal and the “rollback of communism.” To this effect, the Radio Inside the American Sector (RIAS) of West Berlin broadcasted into wide parts of the GDR and played a major role in dis- affecting East Germans with their regime.After the failed 1953 uprising in the GDR, the aborted 1955 Geneva conference and its consequences for respective military integration of both German states into antagonistic blocs, and finally in light of the fate of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, Soviet—supported East Germany was at least taken into account by the United States as a political player. Ambitious rollback schemes through covert operations were phased out gradually and subsequently shelved. After all, the United States had seen no alternative to being just a bystander to the Soviet crackdown of the June 1953 uprising in East Germany. Only after the events, it came up with some inconsistent psychological warfare activities disguised as economic aid for East Germans.
During the Berlin crisis between 1958 and 1961, the GDR under Walter Ulbricht pursued its own political course, which was not always in full congruence with Moscow. For the Western powers, East Berlin evolved willy-nilly into a political factor to be reckoned with. In practical terms East German border police became involved as “Soviet agents” in controlling transportation routes to and from West Berlin via land and water. To the dismay of the conservative government in West Germany, from 1961 the Kennedy administration intensely weighed the pros and cons of recognition of the GDR and intra-German negotiations in a context of wider international detente with the Soviet Union. Lessening of tensions concerning Berlin and the less-determined new Johnson administration relieved some pressure from the West German government. Nonetheless, Washington further encouraged West German initiatives to establish some relationship with the GDR and minimize tensions around Berlin and in Europe.
During all those years, the GDR and its leader Ulbricht did not undertake any serious attempt to reach out to, or even just deal with, the United States beyond propagandistic statements. When Willy Brandt became chancellor in West Germany, however, and his Ostpolitik entered its operational phase, the GDR soon realized that it was in danger of becoming merely an object of Western and Soviet policy interests. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of September 1971, for instance, was in fact negotiated between Washington, Bonn, and Moscow, almost fully excluding the GDR, which relied only on Moscow’s volatile intentions to inform and consult. Eventually, the intra-German Basic Treaty of December 1972 allowed for the GDR’s worldwide diplomatic recognition, and as a result the United States entered into a most basic bilateral relationship with East Berlin.
Washington deliberately took its time in establishing embassies and waited until September 4, 1974, to sign a respective agreement.
Questions of GDR compensation for Jewish claims and former U.S. properties on East German territory remained largely unresolved. Only between 1983 and 1986—that is, during the crisis of Soviet leadership and the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as Moscow’s new leader—did the GDR incite some interest and curiosity among Washington’s executive and legislative branches. After the missile deployment in Western Europe, with U.S.-Soviet relations reaching new low points, the “peace policy” of the GDR and its leader, Erich Honecker, seemed to indicate East Berlin’s interest to stay a reasonable course of mediation beyond cold war confrontation. Even larger loomed Honecker’s desire for international recognition and an official visit to the United States, ignoring President Ronald Reagan’s 1987 Brandenburg Gate appeal to Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” in Berlin.
During the late 1980s, the GDR reached out to the Jewish World Congress and U.S.-based churches operating small branches in East Germany, first and foremost the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- Day Saints (Mormons). Honecker intended to have Salt Lake City, Utah, the center of this church, included in any potential visit. High-ranking East German politician Hermann Axen visited New York and Washington in May 1988 to explore the chances of a Honecker visit, but left his hosts rather unimpressed. The GDR’s resistance against Gorbachev’s reforms significantly diminished the interest in East Germany in Washington.
Mostly private contacts notwithstanding, U.S.-GDR relations in the economic and cultural sector were very modest in quantitative terms. A 1983 agreement between the GDR and the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) in Washington facilitated the exchange of academics between both countries, but was clouded by the GDR’s intention to send primarily natural and engineering scientists to obtain technological knowledge banned from trade with Western countries. Less formalized contacts between Protestant church officials from the GDR and the United States proved more palpable.
Riding those coattails, the GDR state secretary for the churches, Klaus Gysi, even managed to attend National Prayer Breakfasts at the White House.In 1989 the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the East German regime was welcomed enthusiastically in the United States. The administration of President George H. W. Bush, in particular Secretary of State James A. Baker, participated actively and successfully in safeguarding the foreign policy aspects of the German unification process until October 3, 1990.
Bernd Schaefer
See also Berlin Wall; Radio Inside the American Sector
References and Further Reading
Buckow, Anjana. Zwischen Propaganda und Realpolitik. Die USA und der sowjetische besetzte Teil Deutschlands 1945—1955. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003.
Gray, William G. Germany's Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2003.
Grosse, Jurgen. Amerikapolitik und Amerikabild der DDR 1974—1989. Bonn: Bouvier, 1999.
Ostermann, Christian F. “Im Schatten der Bundesrepublik: Die DDR im Kalkul der amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik (1949-1989/90).” Eds. Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppelland. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997. 230-255.