German Unification (1871)
Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s policy toward the United States was one of friendly cooperation, and he demonstrated a willingness to avoid diplomatic and military confrontation with the United States.
After the outbreak of the American Civil War, Bismarck, rejecting all rebellion on principle, issued an immediate declaration against the Confederacy and assured the U.S. minister in May 1861 that his government would be one of the last to recognize the Confederacy. He even instructed Baron Friedrich von Gerolt, the minister in Washington, D.C., not to follow the example of his French colleague in approaching the government in Montgomery on the question of neutral rights.Prussia, looking to a future showdown with France, was anxious to cultivate American friendship. As early as April 1867, Bismarck inquired of Gerolt whether it would be possible, in case of war with France, to purchase armed vessels in the United States and to find crews there. Although the minister thought that unlikely, he promised to make inquires and assured his superior that if war came, the sympathy of the United States would be on the side of Germany. When that sympathy seemed threatened by American press reports that the commander of the German corvette Augusta had attempted to buy or lease territory for a naval station in Costa Rica, Bismarck hastened Gerolt to assure the government in Washington that he regarded maintenance of good relations with the United States as more valuable than any territorial acquisition. When exConfederate captain Raphael Semmes offered his services to the Prussian navy, Bismarck took pains to clear the matter with American authorities and turned down Semme’s request for a commission when informed he was one of the most objectionable men in the South.
Even more important, Prussia moved to satisfy a long-standing American request for the settlement of problems that had arisen with respect to naturalized Americans who returned to their native Germany.
By the so-called Bancroft Treaties of February 1868, the North German Confederation recognized a five-year residence in the United States as sufficient for the acquisition of American citizenship and thus for the voiding of prior military obligations to Germany. Naturalized citizens returning to their homeland were to be exempted from military service for two years, after which time it was to be assumed that they had reestablished residence in Germany and in effect renounced their American citizenship. Although the interpretation of these treaties caused problems for several decades, there can be no doubt that Bismarck regarded the treaties as a serious attempt to accommodate the United States. The treaties marked an auspicious beginning of relations between the United States and the North German Confederation and virtually ensured further American support for Bismarck’s unification plans.In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the United States declared its neutrality, but the American course during the war tended, within the limits prescribed by this neutrality, to favor the cause of Prussia. The astute Bismarck continued to cultivate the goodwill of the United States. He went to extraordinary pains to keep Washington informed of German plans and actions during the war and to thank the United States for any and all gestures of friendship. Moreover, he also adopted a remarkably restrained attitude in the case of the one American action that worked to the detriment of Germany. Since the close of the Civil War, the U.S. government had sold surplus war material to private domestic munitions firms. With the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, a number of these firms began to trade with France; as a result, rifles and other equipment bearing the imprint of the U.S. government arsenals found their way into the hands of the French army. Although these incidents produced enough controversy to lead to a congressional investigation, no German protest was ever lodged.
Bismarck not only recognized the limitations that the American federal system imposed on the possibilities for the control of private arms traffic but also rightly judged that the gain that might result from the official protest would be more than offset by the possible damage to good relations with the United States.His sensitivity to American opinion even led him to recall Friedrich von Gerolt, when that venerable and respected German became too outspoken in his assertion that Germany’s real purpose in seeking the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was not the safeguarding of her borders but the destruction of the power of France.
Bismarck’s solicitude reinforced American predispositions. Throughout the winter of 1870-1871, George Bancroft continued to send his glowing reports of the imminent establishment of the “United States of Germany,” which was certain to be the most liberal government in Europe. Bancroft’s views gained official acceptance.
For nearly a decade these expectations seemed to approach fulfillment, and relations between the two countries remained harmonious and serene. The United States was occupied with problems of Reconstruction and less inclined than ever to pay serious attention to matters outside its borders. Germany, meanwhile, concentrated on securing its new position in Europe by negotiating a series of alliances designed primarily to isolate France. Under the continued guidance of Bismarck, Germany entertained no colonial ambitions, was not yet embarked on a policy of naval expansion, and was not likely to come into direct conflict with the United States.
Michael McGregor
See also Bancroft, George; German
Unification (1990)
References and Further Reading
Gazley, John G. American Opinion of German Unification, 1848-1871. New York: Columbia University, 1926.
Howe, M. A. DeWolfe. The Life and Letters of George Bancroft. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1908.
Lessing, Otto E. Germany and the United States of America during the Era of Bismarck. Reading, PA, 1937.