GIs in West Germany

U.S. military personnel arrived in Ger­many in October 1944 when they occu­pied the border city of Aachen. In the final seven months of World War II, troops of George Patton’s Third Army made their way through towns and cities in southern Germany, eliminating opposition and es­tablishing skeleton military governments before moving on.

The American occupation was not a friendly liberation; the official policy of nonfraternization remained in place until the fall of 1946, and prohibitions against criticizing or insulting the military govern­ment lasted for years. Hotels, office build­ings, and private homes were requisitioned by U.S. military and civilian personnel, causing great hardship to residents of bomb-damaged cities. Moreover, at the conclusion of hostilities, the morale and discipline of the United States forces suf­fered a catastrophic collapse. A year after the defeat of the Nazis, GIs were bartering American cigarettes for jewelry, antiques, and sexual favors; a huge informal prostitu­tion industry had emerged; although, un­like in the Soviet sector, mass rape did not occur. GIs were known for their intemper­ate drinking, casual violence, and, occa­sionally, spectacular criminal behavior, such as the theft of the Hessian crown jew­els by two army officers.

In 1946, in order to combat the wave of criminality, U.S. military governor Gen­eral Lucius Clay allowed military family members to move to Germany. Wives and children contributed a sense of decorum but also added to the burden of requisi­tioning as more homes and schools were taken for use by military families. In 1948, the Berlin Airlift added further numbers of military personnel, albeit in a cause sup­ported by the civilian population. By 1950, however, after the Federal Republic of Ger­many (FRG) was established, the number of GIs in Germany had diminished to 75,000, and many expected the U.S. pres­ence in Germany to end in the near future.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic realized that a U.S. military pres­ence in West Germany was vital to Euro­pean defense against the Soviet Union. In addition to the two army divisions already in Germany came four additional divisions by the end of 1951; until the 1990s the V and VII Corps of the U.S. Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force (later the Seven­teenth Air Force) of the U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) were stationed in West Germany. By 1955 the number of U.S. troops in Germany rose above 300,000. Army and air force personnel, under the United States European Command (USEUCOM), were no longer occupation forces but alliance forces in the North At­lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For the next forty years, Department of De­fense records show that approximately 25 percent of all U.S. personnel worldwide were stationed in West Germany. Rather than continuing to hold requisitioned buildings for the use of U.S. personnel and families, the U.S. forces in the early 1950s began constructing extensive housing and shopping areas for their own use. These “little Americas,” which included post ex­changes (PXs), commissaries, clubs, chapels, sports facilities, and schools, were funded by the German government but used by the Americans. The German gov­ernment paid all occupation costs until 1957.

By 1955, German American relations had evolved from war enmity to a cordial alliance. Regular contact between military commanders and town officials occurred in German American Council meetings, where issues of concern such as noise, traf­fic, and construction were negotiated. In the 1950s, public affairs offices sponsored German American Friendship Weeks cele­brating cooperation and friendship be­tween the two countries. German Ameri­can men’s and women’s clubs proliferated, and both German towns and American military communities organized frequent public events highlighting German Ameri­can friendship. German records show that marriages between Germans and Ameri­cans, mostly German women and Ameri­can soldiers, comprised up to 15 percent of the marriages recorded in German city halls. Like their civilian counterparts in the United States, the U.S. armed forces experienced the 1950s baby boom, and by the end of the decade larger military com­munities (over 20,000) boasted six or more elementary schools, several middle schools, a large high school, and special education facilities. Activities for military children mimicked those in the United States, in­cluding Boy and Girl Scouts, sports, sum­mer camps, and clubs. Military wives did not usually work outside the home but had a number of options available to them: classes in cooking, dancing, bridge, or Ger­man; wives’ club activities; luncheons and teas, social evenings, and balls. Family members and military personnel attended college courses through the extension pro­grams of American universities, borrowed books and magazines at base libraries, and traveled throughout Europe, either on their own or on tours organized by base recreation centers.

Although much of the social life and cultural offerings on military bases in Ger­many attempted to mirror that found back home, military communities were not, in the end, replicas of American towns.

The Vietnam War devastated the GIs in Germany. Approximately 60,000 U.S. troops were transferred to Vietnam, and by 1968 most army units were missing more than half their authorized number of offi­cers. At the same time, combat veterans who had one year left of their two-year mil­itary commitments were sent from Viet­nam to Germany, with little or no adjust­ment; after twelve months in the jungle, they had trouble adapting to peacetime military discipline. Racial violence erupted on and off base, and drug abuse, in large part a spillover from Vietnam, plagued bar­racks and housing areas. Germans, seeing the rise in drug use in their own communi­ties, blamed the trend on U.S. soldiers, not without reason. Crimes committed by sol­diers, including muggings and rape, be­came so common that Germans wondered publicly if the U.S. presence had become a blight on the country. The transition from a draft to a volunteer army in 1973 did not immediately improve the situation; the only segment of the armed forces who could be said to be well trained and disci­plined were female soldiers, who increased in numbers in the 1970s but still com­prised a small minority of all U.S. troops. German leaders wondered whether an army filled with women could really pro­tect Europe, but female soldiers kept the volunteer experiment from falling apart during its first years.

When Ronald Reagan became presi­dent in 1980, Congress had already agreed to increase defense spending, but Reagan made support of the military a cornerstone of his administration. He instituted several hefty military pay raises, increased troop levels, and allocated funds for base con­struction programs. In Germany, the dollar gained strength, and long-delayed base im­provements finally proceeded. By 1985, military morale and readiness was at an all­time high. Paradoxically, the gains came at a time of decreasing support for defense in Germany, especially among German youth. The deployment of Pershing II nu­clear missiles provoked a storm of protest, some of it anti-American, and the U.S. forces were the targets of periodic terrorist attacks from the left-wing Red Army Fac­tion (RAF).

In November 1989, the Berlin Wall abruptly fell, along with the governments of most Eastern bloc nations. Suddenly the rationale for maintaining large numbers of U.S. troops in Germany disappeared, and the Department of Defense planned a mas­sive Reduction in Force (RIF). Throughout the 1990s installations closed, and the numbers of troops in Germany dimin­ished. By 1995, 100,000 troops remained, and four years later, U.S. forces in Ger­many totaled only 58,000.

In 2002 the commander of the U.S. forces in Europe began to examine the pos­sibility of moving most GIs out of Ger­many, sending them back to the United States, from where they would be deployed for short periods to bases in Poland, Ro­mania, Bulgaria, or other eastern European nations. The new bases, which have not yet been built, would not be “little Americas,” but rather “forward operating bases” (FOBs), resembling the stripped-down temporary bases in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East. German critics assert that the plan was embraced by the

Department of Defense in retaliation for Germany’s opposition to the U.S. war in Iraq, but such a transformation had been hinted at in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. The ongoing war in Iraq has com­plicated plans to close bases in Germany, as they have played an important role in sup­port and logistical operations for the con­flict. Nevertheless, barring some unfore­seen calamity, the U.S. military presence in Germany will continue to shrink almost to nonexistence.

Anni Baker

See also African Americans; American Occupation Zone; Denazification; German American Clubs (in West Germany); Halvorsen, Gail S.; U.S. Bases in West Germany; West Berlin

References and Further Reading

Hohn, Maria. GIs and Frauleins: The German- American Encounter in 1950s West Germany. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

Nelson, Daniel J. A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987a.

------. Defenders or Intruders? The Dilemmas of U.S. Forces in Germany. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987b.

Seiler, Signe. Die GIs: Amerikanische Soldaten in Deutschland. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985.