Latin America, German Military Advisers in
From the Iberian conquest of America to the independence of the Latin American republics, German soldiers actively contributed to military developments on that continent. However, a regular exchange of professional German military experts to Latin America started only in the 1880s.
Up to World War I, a network of German officers in many countries of the region developed and became an important element of imperial policies.In the late nineteenth century, the international situation of South America was tense. Border conflicts among countries such as Chile and Bolivia and Peru or Argentina and Chile created a climate of conflict and competition. Due to the boom of exports in many of these countries, a certain degree of prosperity had reached the region, allowing governments to invest in projects of modernization. From the perspective of many political leaders in Latin America, the modernization of the military was a top priority. With that evaluation they followed European trends in the age of radical nationalism and militarism. Thus, prior to 1914, Latin Americans had their own miniature version of the European arms race. A central element of this competition was the employment of foreign military advisers to professionalize and increase the efficiency of the officer corps and armies. In addition, civil governments intended to depoliticize the officers, while at the same time use the army as an instrument to keep up the social status quo. European officers and, after the Franco-German War of 1870-1871, the triumphant Prussian officers, were the candidates of choice for Latin American political leaders.
German authorities reciprocated the interest in sending out assorted military men to Latin America. As representatives of the highly acclaimed Prusso-German army, these officers were supposed to increase the prestige of the German Empire abroad.
This was important because rivals of Germany, such as France and the United States, also intensified their military advisership in the region during this period. Moreover, the German government wanted to profit economically from the advisers by gaining lucrative orders for military equipment and instructed them accordingly. Given the European arms race, which made the advantages of modern weaponry obsolete in short intervals, Latin America seemed to be a perfect market for outdated equipment. The region could also serve as a training ground. In addition, the professionalization of the Latin America military and thus the stabilization of the political system seemed to be in the genuine interest of German foreign investment. Therefore, the political and military leadership in Berlin supported the recruitment of German officers by Latin American governments and their activities in Latin America. The imperial government invited influential Latin American envoys and decorated them. In addition, it admitted an increasing number of young cadets and officers from Latin America to the elitist military academies in Germany.Until the outbreak of World War I, numerous Latin American countries directly or indirectly used German military know-how. German influence grew especially strong in Chile. In 1885 a Prussian artillery captain of Saxon origin, Emil Korner, was the first officer to go to Chile in order to serve in the Chilean army. Due to his restructuring of the army, the Chilean soldiers soon came to be called the “Prussians of South America.” German military influence was also directly felt in Argentina and Bolivia where German officers served prior to the war. German military methods spread indirectly to Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Guatemala through Chilean instructors who had received their own schooling under the Prussian system. Moreover, these countries sent young officers to Chile for training. From 1902 even Francophile Brazil sent officers to Germany, and Mexico planned to invite a German military mission—a project that failed to materialize because of the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution.
German military advisers, who since the 1890s usually went in groups to Latin America, were active in all spheres of Latin American military life. They introduced the draft, wrote new instructions for training and maneuvers, and founded war academies. In Chile, German officers also actively participated in regular military service, while, for example, in Argentina their service remained restricted to schooling cadets and officers.
Commissioning orders for the German arms industry was an additional important task of German military advisers in Latin America. From the perspective of the industry in the Reich, exports to that continent were crucial to keep up high rates of production in peacetime and to further technical developments. Other European governments participated in the race for the Latin American market of armaments, yet none supported its industry as decisively as the German Empire. Firms like Friedrich Krupp and the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabrik Berlin-Karlsruhe (Ludwig Loewe Konzern; German Weapons and Ammunition Factory) cooperated closely with civil and military authorities and with the advisers to promote their businesses in Latin America. Thus, especially between 1907 and 1914, German interests successfully competed with French and English firms for large orders of weaponry and other military equipment from Latin American countries.
World War I disrupted the close German Latin American military cooperation because the advisers returned to Germany, and Latin American officers in Germany had to return to their own countries. Yet military attaches of both sides—for example, the German navy attache for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay in Buenos Aires, August Moller—maintained contact. Thus, interned German sailors and ships in Latin America received favorable treatment. In return, the German High Command admitted Latin American attaches to the European front. Some of these Latin American officers in Germany even participated in the German propaganda effort by writing books and articles in Spanish praising the German war efforts.
Thus, the head of the Argentinean war academy, Jose F. Uriburu, and the Chilean general, Jorge Boonen Rivera, even as late as 1918 continued to spread the word of German invincibility.When Germany adopted unconditional submarine warfare, pressure groups (e.g., parts of the press, some political parties, economic interests, etc.) supported by French and English and later U.S. interests demanded that Latin American nations such as Chile and Argentina break off relations with the German Empire. Many contemporary observers—and some histori- ans—agreed that the neutrality of these and other countries of the region was due in large measure to the sympathies that the influential military establishment held for Germany. Indeed, the long-standing military relations were important and often more effective than the weak German propaganda efforts in Latin America during the war. Yet the main reason for Latin American neutrality was the lack of interest in participating in a costly European war.
The German defeat of 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles drastically changed the context. The fifth part of the treaty provided, among other things, for the reduction of German military forces, a ban on certain types of arms including submarines and military airplanes, and a ban on German military advisers to foreign countries. In addition, according to article 179, the German government was bound to prevent unemployed former officers from leaving the country to join the armies of foreign countries. Yet, the number of German officers who wanted to leave the Reich was large. Many resented the new republican government, which they held responsible for the defeat and the loss of their jobs and social prestige. Thus, it was hardly surprising that, despite the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, a considerable number tried to find positions abroad where their experience and know-how were still held in esteem.
Although the French, English, and U.S. militaries now intensified their activities in Latin America, some governments in the region were actively looking for German advisers as soon after the war as 1919.
The prewar ties to the German system and the personal bonds of friendship established over the course of three decades proved strong. Moreover, Latin American military and political leaders had an interest in the newly won wartime experience that German officers could boast, as well as in the counterinsurgency skills they had acquired during the postwar upheaval in Germany. In several countries, German officers managed to gain entry into the military and to continue their work as military advisers. By 1929—1930, the number of German military instructors in Latin America had jumped to thirty-eight in five different countries. At that point, Argentina became the new center of German military activities in Latin America, although the network of advisers stretched to Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, and there were attempts to establish it in Paraguay and Colombia. Officers like Wilhelm Faupel, Hans von Kiesling, Hans Kretzschmar, and Hans Kundt had close connections to Germany. They arranged for the supply of German advisers in neighboring countries, regulated the recruitment of new advisers in Germany, and communicated among each other.The attitude of the German government to the military advisers was ambivalent. The foreign office feared protests and negative consequences because of the obvious breach of the Versailles Treaty. Diplomats were instructed to keep the advisers officially at a distance. Yet, the Department on Latin American Affairs within the Foreign Ministry also appreciated closer relations to the Latin American countries and thus kept informal ties to most officers. The Defense Ministry was a strong supporter of the German military advisers. The German military establishment kept in close touch with the men in Latin America, helped them in recruiting new personnel, and even admitted Latin American officers to courses in Germany.
Compared to the prewar period, most of these activities remained clandestine. Advisers in Latin America usually had to camouflage themselves as civil instructors and in some instances even had to give up their German citizenship.
In addition, the resistance of Latin American nationalists to foreign advisers had grown. Thus, without diplomatic support, the advisers ran into a host of difficulties, and some had to leave their countries of choice after only a short stint. Others, such as the notorious General Hans Kundt in Bolivia, became the object of domestic political strife and were repeatedly used as scapegoats.Possibilities to cooperate with the German arms industry were also severely restricted, but they continued to exist—de- spite the prohibitions of the Treaty of Versailles. An efficient military adviser like Faupel managed to arrange for substantial Argentinean and Peruvian orders with the German arms producers, under the cover of firms in countries such as Denmark and Sweden. The major part of the business, however, now went to European and U.S. competitors.
The activities of many German advisers came to an end during the Great Depression. Political upheavals in Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina undermined the precarious situation of the advisers. In addition, Latin American governments soon lacked the money to further pay for their services. Thus, many had to leave Latin America. Already in 1929 Peruvian dictator Augusto B. Leguιa fired Faupel. Kundt had to leave Bolivia by the end of 1933, after a series of devastating defeats in the Chaco War against Paraguay. In Chile the group of German officers dwindled to three. Under General Kiesling they stayed until 1937, when the military mission officially ended. Only in Argentina were German military advisers reinforced during the
Nazi dictatorship. A German military mission continued to work in that country up until 1940. In addition, because of the open remilitarization of its arms industry, Nazi Germany returned as a major bidder for Latin American markets. Countries such as Argentina and Chile bought a major part of their military equipment and weaponry in Germany until World War II finally put an end to the connection.
Stefan Rinke
See also Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Faupel, Wilhelm; Kiesling, Hans von; Mexico; Treaty of Versailles
References and Further Reading
Atkins, George Pope, and Larry V. Thompson. “German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921—1940.” Journal of Latin American Studies 4 (1972): 257-274.
Bieber, Leon E. “La polιtica militar alemana en Bolivia, 1900-1935.” Latin American Research Review 29, 1 (2000): 85-106.
Brunn, Gerhard. “Deutscher Einfluβ und deutsche Interessen in der Professionalisierung einiger lateinamerikanischer Armeen vor dem 1. Weltkrieg (1885-1914).” Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 6 (1969): 278-279.
Nunn, Frederick M. Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890—1940. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1983.
Rinke, Stefan. Der letzte freie Kontinent: Deutsche Lateinamerikapolitik im Zeichen transnationaler Beziehungen, 1918—1933. Stuttgart: Heinz, 1996.
------. “Eine Pickelhaube macht noch keinen PreuEen: Preuβisch-deutsche Militarberater, ‘Militarethos’ und Modernisierung in Chile, 1886-1973.” In Preuβen und Lateinamerika: Im Spannungsfeld von Kommerz, Macht und Kultur. Eds. Sandra Carreras and Gunther Maihold. Munster: Lit, 2004, pp. 259-283.
Sater, William F., and Holger H. Herwig. The Grand Illusion: The Prussianization of the Chilean Army. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1999.
Schaefer, Jurgen. Deutsche Militarhilfe an Sudamerika: Militar- und Rustungsinteressen in Argentinien, Bolivien und Chile vor 1914. Dusseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1974.
White, Elizabeth B. German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900 to 1945. New York: Garland, 1991.