Sociedad Colombo- Alemana de Transportes Aereos
One of the earliest and, for more than a decade, most successful ventures in civil aviation in Latin America. Founded in 1919, the Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aereos (Colombian-German Air Transport Company, SCADTA) was perceived as a symbol of the resurgence of German interest in the region after World War I.
Its “German” character, however, was not so clear.The 1920s and early 1930s were the pioneering days of civil aviation. During World War I, technology had advanced immensely. After the war, more and better aircraft, trained personnel, and equipment were available than ever before. The development and production of aircraft and the creation of airlines rested primarily with private initiatives in Europe and the United States. Besides its well-known military potential, aviation soon became a sign of prestige on the international stage and in commercial relations. Hence, governments developed an interest in the new means of transport as an element of foreign policy. This was observable especially in Germany, where aviation promised to compensate for the loss of military power at the Treaty of Versailles.
For economic and geographic reasons, Latin America soon emerged as an important market for the export of aircraft, as well as for airline enterprises. Competition was intense because French, German, and later American firms fought for their share relentlessly. Because of the peace treaty, German aircraft producers in the early 1920s had to move to foreign countries to test machines, make progress in technological development, and increase sales. Latin America emerged as a center of interest because the notorious problems of transport in countries such as Colombia for the first time seemed solvable—thanks to civil aviation.
German interest in Colombian aviation can be explained by three factors. First, the Andean country had been one of the few neutral countries during the war.
Second, German emigrants had a long tradition in steamship navigation on the Magdalena river. The presence of a small but influential group of German expatriates served to attract German aircraft producers. Third, there was a pool of former German military pilots without jobs willing to take the high-risk venture of aviation in Colombia.On December 5, 1919, SCADTA was founded in Barranquilla, initiated by German and Colombian businessmen. The company was a direct response to a French aviation venture begun a few months earlier. The founders of the company planned to import German airplanes and to employ German personnel. Their success was to be a first sign of German revival after the humiliation at Versailles and a starting signal for the reestablishment of commercial relations between Colombia and Germany.
After buying the brand-new Junkers airplane F 13, the first metal airplane in the world, in Germany and recruiting pilots such as Fritz W. Hammer and Hellmuth von Krohn, and the technician Wilhelm Schnurbusch, SCADTA made its first successful flights along the Rio Magdalena. This marked the first time the coast and the capital Bogota had been connected via airplane. The company received special conditions for selling airmail stamps in return. However, the flights did not immediately bring the badly needed economic stabilization. The organization of SCADTA’s main office in Barranquilla left much to be desired. In addition, its airplanes were seriously damaged after accidents during the test flights and negotiations for credit in Germany with the Junkers Company proved difficult.
In 1921 and 1922, however, four more F 13s were exported to Colombia on a leasing arrangement between SCADTA and Junkers. Due to the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles these exports had to be sent secretly via the Netherlands. Test flights went well for SCADTA, and the company received an official airmail contract for the route Barranquilla-Girardot- Neiva. Connections from Barranquilla to the nearby port cities Cartagena and Santa Marta were soon added.
Until 1924 SCADTA regularly expanded its service on this route. Its reliability became well known even beyond Colombian borders.The distance from Barranquilla to Gi- rardot amounted to approximately 1,000 km (625 miles). The ships on the Magdalena took 10 to 14 days for the trip. Twice a week SCADTA’s services shortened this journey for 3 passengers and up to 40 kg (88 pounds) of cargo to 8.5 hours. From Girar- dot passengers and cargo traveled by train to the capital, which took another 8.5 hours. The distance from Girardot to Neiva was 150 km (94 miles) and was serviced once a week by a 70-minute flight. The alternative was a trip on horseback of 4 to 5 days. The saving of time was expensive, however. The price for a one-way ticket amounted to 250 pesos—only slightly less than the average monthly income of the pilots.
In economic terms, SCADTA’s basis was its virtual airmail monopoly. The company held this monopoly until 1932, when the Administracion del Correo Aereo was created. Already in 1922 the contract with the Colombian government was considerably extended. The company got the official government order to develop the national and international airmail services of Colombia. Hence, SCADTA set up its own post offices in Colombia and abroad, issued its own airmail stamps, and even delivered the mail. Because of the very favorable airmail contract, SCADTA was the most profitable airline of its times—indeed the only one that could manage to do without direct government subsidies.
Despite setbacks, such as the mortal accident of Krohn, SCADTA had consolidated its status as the leading airline of Colombia, nationally and internationally known for its reliability and its success in pioneering air routes under difficult circumstances by 1924. At this point the company’s directorate developed plans for extending service to neighboring Venezuela, the Caribbean, Central America, and then via Cuba to Florida. At that point SCADTA’s project provoked the suspicion of the United States, which was anxious to protect the Panama Canal.
Emphasizing the Colombian nationality of their company, SCADTA managers led unsuccessful negotiations with the postmaster general and the United Fruit Company in New York. United States government agencies were opposed to the plans of what to them was a German enterprise in a region of special American interest.As a last resort, SCADTA tried to mobilize public opinion in Colombia and Panama against the restrictive U.S. aviation policy. The effects of its press campaign, however, proved to be counterproductive in the United States. Opposition to SCADTA’s schemes was reinforced. In general, American aviation interests looked upon the new European airlines in Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, and other Latin American countries as a threat to their sphere of influence. In addition, the technical potential of American aircraft producers and airlines was increasing. SCADTA’s activities had sparked initiatives for the creation of an international airmail service. The results were a legal code for aviation and, more importantly, the foundation of Pan American Airways (PAN AM) in 1927. This company was turned into a highly subsidized and commissioned instrument of U.S. government policy.
In the meantime, events in Germany gained significance for the further development of SCADTA. In 1926 the Deutsche Luft Hansa was founded as the central instrument of German aviation policy and inherited stock shares in SCADTA. After the foundation of an airline in Brazil, Syn- dicato Condor, Luft Hansa managed a formal delimitation of the spheres of interest of the new company and SCADTA. Apart from the Pacific Coast, South America south of Cape Roque was to be the exclusive zone of interest of Lufthansa and its subsidiary. The sphere of SCADTA was defined as Colombia, Venezuela, the Guayanas, and the Pacific Coast. The company also held a prerogative to create airlines in Central America. In Peru, Chile, and Mexico, both groups were willing to cooperate if necessary.
Moreover, financial relations were clarified by an exchange of stocks. On the whole, while both parties wanted a future “cooperation of friendly neighbors” in Latin America the agreement between SCADTA and its German partners was a parting of the ways.Moreover, American competition made itself felt in Latin America. Following the European example, a promotional flight of the U.S. Air Force was carried out in 1926 and 1927. While this mission was not very fortunate, Charles A. Lindbergh’s Atlantic crossing in May 1927 gave American aviation the decisive thrust. Just in time for the Pan-American conference, Lindbergh arrived in Havana and from there visited Colombia. Lindbergh’s flights were not only a sign of goodwill but also of the expansionist designs of U.S. aviation policy. Backed by the government in Washington, American airlines now planned to build their own international service in Latin America. However, they needed permission to fly over Colombian territory, which—for the moment—was not granted due to SCADTA’s opposition.
SCADTA answered the American challenge with unprecedented growth within Colombia between 1927 and 1929. On an international scale, SCADTA advanced decisively with the new line from Buenaventura to Guayaquil in Ecuador in 1928. This was the company’s first regular service beyond Colombian borders and it planned to extend service along the West Coast to Peru and Chile. Yet, only a few months later, PAN AM was granted a similar concession, and by the end of 1929 it became clear that SCADTA had lost the race for Peru.
In 1929, SCADTA celebrated its tenth anniversary with great publicity. The press emphasized that the world’s oldest and most reliable airline, SCADTA, was a Colombian enterprise. In Germany, on the other hand, SCADTA’s achievements were interpreted as proof of German “thoroughness and energy.” The management of the company stressed one or the other nationality, depending on the situation. Indeed, SCADTA had continued to receive the moral support of the German government.
Very important was the publicity trip of ex-chancellor Hans Luther to Latin America in 1926. However, the plan for an exclusively German airline covering the whole Latin American subcontinent had to be abandoned after 1929 when it became clear that U.S. competition was insurmountable.The Great Depression made itself felt in Colombia as early as 1928. In the following years, SCADTA’s development was determined to a large degree by the Colombian slump. While the performance in 1929 reached new heights in terms of miles flown and passengers and cargo carried, the results for 1930 were already much less favorable. In the meantime, the competition by PAN AM and its subsidiary Panagra grew steadily, thanks to generous U.S. government subsidies. Whether in Ecuador, Peru, Panama, or Venezuela, everywhere SCADTA had to confront the Americans, who seemed to have all the money and diplomatic support they wanted.
Because of the tight financial situation SCADTA managers sooner or later had to accept an agreement with the U.S. competitors. Already in 1929, SCADTA had to sign contracts of cooperation with PAN AM. Under the pressure of the slump, neither the German nor the Colombian governments were willing and able to help SCADTA out financially. Under these circumstances PAN AM bought 84 percent of the stock of SCADTA between February 1930 and April 1931. In return, the Colombian airline received financial support that allowed for the purchase of new American aircraft. SCADTA had to give up its international services. From that moment on, the company was confined to flying within Colombian borders and became a supplier for the big American parent company. The “gentleman’s agreement” (Boy 1963, 123) between SCADTA and PAN AM was not a secret. But the degree of the American takeover was known only to a few insiders. Neither the Colombian public and authorities nor the German envoy knew exactly whether SCADTA was still Colombian or American. The reason was that the old personnel were allowed to continue working in relative autonomy.
After Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, the activities of German aviation interests in and the export of German weapons to Latin America caused concern for the U.S. government. Though the majority of shares were controlled by PAN AM, SCADTA was still too “German” in the eyes of American officials. For a variety of reasons SCADTA’s star was slowly but surely on the wane after 1934. Hitler’s criminal policies and the arrival of Jewish refugees contributed to anti-German sentiment in Colombia. More important for the deterioration of SCADTA’s image in Colombia was an accident in June 1935 that caused a number of casualties, one of whom was Carlos Gardel, the Argentinean tango idol. When the political situation in Europe worsened in 1938, U.S. and Colombian apprehension about the “German” SCADTA increased. After the outbreak of the war, PAN AM carried out orders from the U.S. Department of State and, with tacit approval of the Colombian government, forced German employees out of the company in 1940. Shortly afterward, SCADTA was formally liquidated and formed into Avianca (Aerovias Na- cionales de Colombia). In the new company, PAN AM retained control, although the Colombian government held 40 percent of the shares.
Stefan Rinke
See also Lindbergh, Charles Augustus; Treaty of Versailles
References and Further Reading
Boy, Herbert. Una historia con alas. Bogota: Iqueima, 1963.
Davies, Reginald E. G. Airlines of Latin America since 1919. London: Putnam, 1984.
Newton, Wesley P The Perilous Sky: United States Aviation Diplomacy and Latin America, 1919—1931. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1978.
Randall, Stephen J. The Diplomacy of Modernization: Colombian-American Relations, 1920—1940. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1977.
Rinke, Stefan. Der letzte freie Kontinent: Deutsche Lateinamerikapolitik im Zeichen transnationaler Beziehungen, 1918—1933. Stuttgart: Heinz, 1996.
------. “‘Amalgamarse al alma de Colombia’: SCADTA y los principios de la aviacion en Colombia, 1919—1940.” Innovar: Revista de ciencias administrativas y sociales (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota) 10 (July-December 1997): 7—30.