Treaty of Versailles
The rise of Nazism in Germany is sometimes attributed to the signing of one of the most significant documents in history: the Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919). Eight months after the United States entered World War I, President Woodrow Wilson formulated his famous Fourteen Points.
A few months later the German government, facing heavy losses on the battleground, appealed to Wilson to start negotiations on the basis of these principles. Following intense U.S. consultations with the other Allied and Associated Powers, first an armistice was concluded with Germany on November 11, 1918, then a yearlong comprehensive peace conference was organized in Paris between January 1919 and January 1920. The Treaty of Versailles was a product of the Paris process. Though the treaty marked the conclusion of fighting between the Allies and Germany, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it. Technically, the United States would remain at war with Germany until the Treaty of Berlin in 1921.The Treaty of Versailles consisted of 15 parts and 440 articles. Its provisions included, among others, the return of nearly 15 percent of German-held territory to neighboring states: namely, France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (Parts II and III); special administrative arrangements or plebiscites for the Saar (Articles 49—50), Memel (Article 99), Danzig (Articles 100—108), and Schleswig (Articles 109—114); prohibition of union (Anschluss) between Germany and Austria (Article 80); reallocation of all German colonies under a system of mandates (Article 22; Part III; and Part IV, Section I); termination of German rights, titles, and privileges in China, Thailand, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Kiaochow (Part IV, Sections II—VIII); limitation of the German army to 100,000 men with no general staff, no conscription, no heavy artillery, no tanks, no aircraft, no ships over 10,000 tons, and no submarines (Part V); and establishment of a reparation commission to ensure Germany’s payment of a heavy compensation (Part VIII).
In addition, Germany was declared the “aggressor” (Article 231), and provision was made for the creation of a special tribunal to put on trial German war leaders, including Wilhelm II (Part VII).The fairness and implications of these provisions remained the subject of intense debate in the following years. Naturally, the Germans found the treaty extremely unjust. Perhaps more importantly, public opinion in the Allied states was divided, especially in Britain and France. While some groups expressed concern that such a harsh treaty could justifiably provoke further German aggression in the years to come, others employed a reverse logic and insisted that the treaty’s provisions were weak and far from securing a pacific Germany in the long term. Unlike other Allies, the United States was not so much concerned with the German-related provisions of the treaty as it was with another, highly original, aspect of it. The Versailles document contained, in Part I, the covenant of the first universal political organization in history; namely the League of Nations. As such, it was something more than a typical peace treaty. Although the league idea was in conformity with the president’s fourteenth point, the U.S. Senate (then under Republican control) was hostile to the League of Nations, in part, precisely because this was Wilson’s idea. More importantly, however, Congress had serious reservations about what it perceived to be an attempt at supranationalism. Two articles in particular reinforced U.S. skepticism: Article 5, which prescribed the rule of unanimity in substantive decision-making; and Article 10, by which all league members would undertake to protect other members against external aggression.
From a formal, legal perspective, the Treaty of Versailles did not establish any special bilateral relationship between the United States and Germany. In general, the treaty’s provisions made reference to the United States in its capacity as one of the principal Allies.
According to Article 88, for instance, the United States would be one of the four members of an international commission in charge of boundary matters. Similarly, the United States was one of the four major powers in the Reparation Commission, who would enjoy full voting privileges (Article 244). One of the five judges in the special war crimes tribunal would be appointed by the United States (Article 227). Perhaps more important for direct German American interaction were the provisions in Part XII of the treaty entitled “Ports, Waterways and Railways.” In accordance with Articles 339, 357, and 374 under Part XII, the amount and specifications of the material ceded from Germany would be determined by U.S.-appointed arbitrators.So far as German American relations were concerned, the most significant implications of the treaty could be found in its financial provisions (Parts VIII, IX, and X)—which is not to deny the wider consequences of these provisions for the evolving international system in general. There were no historical precedents for the indemnity imposed on Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. While, in principle, Germany was required to compensate no more than the damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property as a result of its aggression, a provision had been added to the armistice to the effect that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States would not be prejudiced by ongoing financial settlements. In previous wars, reparations had consisted of determinate amounts, and had been measured in lump sums of money. As long as the defeated parties were meeting the annual installments of cash, no further interference had been necessary. In the Treaty of Versailles, however, the amount was not determined. The sum, which might well change depending on new claims, could prove not only in excess of what could be paid in cash, but also in excess of what could be paid at all. In the final analysis, this could be interpreted as potential U.S.
domination over postwar Germany arising from the Treaty of Versailles. After all, as John Maynard Keynes put it in a nutshell, the war had ended with everyone owing everyone else immense sums of money, with the United States being the only exception. Germany owed a large sum to the Allies; the Allies owed a large sum toBritain; and Britain owed a large sum to the United States, which had acquired the status of the “first among equals.” Coupled with the Reparation Commission’s enormous powers, this fact meant that the United States was in effect put in charge of Germany’s socioeconomic future.
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See also Dawes Plan; World War I
References and Further Reading
Carr, Edward H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
Hurst, Cecil. Memorandum on the American Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 18 November 1919. London: Documents on British Foreign Policy, Series I, vol. V, no. 399.
Keynes, John M. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1920.
Lodge, Henry C. Reservations with Regard to the Treaty [of Versailles] and The Senate Debate on the Treaty of Versailles. Official Records, 66th US Congress.
Nye, Russel B., and J. E. Morpurgo. A History of the United States. Vol. 2. Harmondsworth, Middlessex, UK: Penguin Books, 1955.
Treaty of Versailles. Full text available online at the Yale University Avalon Project website at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ imt/menu.htm (cited June 11, 2003).