Venezuelan Crisis (1902-1903)
The Venezuelan crisis of 1902 and 1903 was a decisive turning point, not only for German American relations but also for the international system prior to World War I. German expansionist designs in Latin America clashed with U.S.
ambitions based upon the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. The Venezuelan incident was the last traditional armed intervention of European powers in Latin America. After Venezuela, the European alliance system reached its final prewar form with Anglo- German antagonism as the keystone.Beginning in the 1880s, traditional German economic ties to Latin America rapidly gained importance. Colonial enthusiasts in Germany hoped to win a colony in that region for the surplus population of the Reich. Yet, in the 1890s, German expansion was slowed down by the world economic crisis and growing competition with the United States, which began to pay more attention to its neighbors in the Southern Hemisphere. The depression of the 1890s that had led to an industrial surplus production made new markets necessary. Before World War I the new policy was, however, only partially successful and U.S. trade never matched that of Great Britain or Germany.
Although the economic penetration of Latin America by Germany and the United States did not meet expectations, both countries increased naval armaments so as to gain a military advantage. Moreover, despite Germany’s failure to achieve its aims at the peace negotiations to end the Spanish-American War of 1898 and 1899, German naval planners continued to demand coaling stations in the Caribbean. In contrast to Great Britain, Germany never openly accepted the Monroe Doctrine that required it to leave the Western Hemisphere to the guidance of the United States. From a U.S. perspective at the turn of the twentieth century, Germany had become the most threatening rival in Latin America.
Venezuela was one of the hot spots for German American rivalry. German commercial houses held a dominant position in Venezuelan foreign trade, and a group of powerful German industrial enterprises had developed an ambitious railway project. The political situation in Venezuela at the turn of the twentieth century was far from stable though. A border conflict with British Guyana peaking in 1895 had demonstrated the weakness of the country.
It had also proved the power of the United States and its ability to intervene in Venezuelan foreign relations and act on its behalf in conflicts with European powers.
In 1899 Cipriano Castro, an allegedly “liberal” caudillo, took power in Venezuela. Castro’s reign met with resistance within the country. The strongman resorted to violence and oppression, plunging Venezuela into a civil war. In the course of the fighting, foreign economic activities in Venezuela came to a standstill. Castro stopped repaying the foreign debt and raised tariffs, thus hurting foreign economic interests even more. From 1900 onward, the German government reacted to the rapidly worsening situation by sending warships to the coast of Venezuela. Sensing U.S. apprehension, Germany informed the government in Washington that an aggressive action against Venezuela might be required. Great Britain and Italy had causes for complaint against Venezuela, too, and negotiations about joint measures with Germany were completed by the end of November 1902. In December, the European allied blockade began, and allied naval forces seized Venezuelan gunboats and bombarded Puerto Cabello. Soon Castro sent an offer for arbitration, yet the German side hesitated to accept it.
Meanwhile, developments in Venezuela had caused considerable anxiety in the Americas. What, from a European perspective, looked like a routine intervention of European powers against a Latin American country was perceived as a grave threat in the United States and in Latin America.
Leading politicians and newspapers of the region believed that Germany was the motor behind an apparent European scheme that might ultimately lead to the partition of Venezuela. The United States demonstrated its seriousness in the matter unmistakably when the U.S. Navy staged maneuvers in the Caribbean region. In connection with these events, Theodore Roosevelt several years later claimed that he had uncompromisingly threatened the Germans and in that manner had directly forced Berlin to consent to arbitration. This claim has been the object of much scholarly debate. While it has never been proven, the pressure that the president did exert was certainly strong and played an important role in the German decision to back down.On December 18, the European allies officially consented to arbitration. Because the U.S. government itself had claims against Venezuela, it could not officially act as a mediator. To compromise, a simple U.S. citizen was chosen to represent Venezuela. However, this “simple citizen” was the U.S. minister at Caracas, Herbert W. Bowen, and Washington was the place of negotiations. Thus, the United States remained very much involved in settling the affair. Public opinion in the United States remained uneasy because Germany continued to employ coercive measures and a German cruiser shelled a Venezuelan fort in January. In Great Britain public pressure on the government to pull out of the alliance with Germany increased. Soon Germany was isolated. The German government reacted to the worsening situation by sending Roosevelt’s friend Hermann Speck von Sternburg as ambassador to Washington. Sternburg was instrumental in calming U.S. public opinion.
In February 1903 the contestants reached an agreement. Venezuela had to pay the most urgent demands of the allies immediately. All other claims were transferred for further negotiation to the Court of International Arbitration in The Hague. Thus, Germany’s minimal demand of preferential treatment for the powers that had participated in the blockade was at least partially met, while the idea of putting Venezuelan customs under international control had to be dropped.
From the German perspective, the Venezuelan affair was a complete failure. Right-wing criticism against the alleged record of German weakness grew. In addition, the blockade of Venezuela was the last attempt to cooperate with Great Britain on an international scale. Wilhelm II was enraged with the British, and German leaders now hoped for a rapprochement with the United States instead.
This hope was not reciprocated, however. On the contrary, the crisis convinced Roosevelt of the necessity to modify the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, which he did in his corollary of December 1904. The “big stick” that Roosevelt wanted to use against European intervention in Latin American affairs was by then mainly intended as an instrument against German expansionism. Through its aggressive behavior during the Venezuelan crisis, Germany had by 1903 taken the place of Great Britain as potential enemy number one in the United States.
Stefan Rinke
See also Far East, U.S.-German Entente in the; First Moroccan Crisis (1905-1906)
References and Further Reading
Esthus, Raymond A. Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries. Waltham, CA: Regina, 1970.
Fiebig-von Hase, Ragnhild. Lateinamerika als Konfliktherd der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, 1890—1903: Vom Beginn der Panamerikapolitik bis zur Venezuelakrise von 1902/03. 2 vols. Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1986.
Herwig, Holger H. Germany’s Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871—1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1986.
Hood, Miriam. Gunboat Diplomacy: 1885—1905: Great Power Pressure in Venezuela. London: Allen & Unwin, 1975.
Rinke, Stefan. Zwischen Weltpolitik und Monroe Doktrin: Botschafter Speck von Sternburg und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, 1898—1908. Stuttgart: Heinz, 1992.