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Migration Stories

22 September 2009, Day 1: The mosque at Hersek was our first clue— traces of Balkan-Anatolian synergy began here. Many times restored, the mosque was built by Hersekzade Ahmed Pa⅞a, who is buried in the garden.

He was a Bosnian aristocrat who “turned Ottoman” and served Sultans Mehmed II (“Fatih,” “the Conqueror”), Bayezid II, and Selim I; he mar­ried a daughter of Bayezid (Finkel et al., 2011, p. 49). Hersek is the former Helenopolis, built in 327 CE by the Emperor Constantine I to commemo­rate the birthplace of his mother. Alluvial deposits now cover all Roman and Byzantine remains except for one marooned lump of masonry sur­rounded by wetlands, the ruins of an aqueduct that brought water here from the spring at Ayazma (Soguksu, “cold water,” our second campsite)Expedition and Reenactment 205 (Finkel et al., 2011, p. 49). Evliya first visited Hersek in 1648 and many times afterward, reporting that 700 households had been transplanted by Ahmed Pa⅞a to revitalize the place and guard the crossing, the narrowest point in the Gulf of Izmit (Finkel et al., 2011, p. 49). Here boats transported people and horses across the water to regain “the road to Baghdad” that leads into Anatolia: the road to war, commerce, the East. Evliya saw 70 shops; a caravanserai feeding and lodging travelers and their horses and camels; 5 hans or hostelries; and a great mosque complex containing a bathhouse, small prayer hall, 2 schools (a medrese, Qur’an school, and a mektep, high school), a dervish lodge, two more hans, and a soup kitchen (Finkel et al., 2011, p. 49). When we camped in 2009, Hersek had, besides the mosque, one kahvehane (coffeehouse) and one bakal (shop), while the former quay was out of bounds as a military zone. Now the Osman Gazi Bridge, opened in 2016, spans the strait.

We were on the track of Ottoman imperial relationships with the Balkans and other territories beyond Anatolia from which the empire drew its strength.

Karen Barkey (2008) attributes the resiliency and longevity of the Ottoman state to policies of accommodation (istimalet) (p. 51), comradeship (noker) (p. 42), and also stirgtin (forced migration) (pp. 123, 128-130), all of which represent “a polity that drew boundaries, but nurtured movement across them” because there was “a strong Ottoman belief in the value of Ottoman heterogeneity” (p. 122). In other words, “difference was tolerated because it had something to contribute” (Barkey, 2008, p. 110). Consequently, migrants and refugees would have found a readier welcome in Ottoman ter­ritory than elsewhere. As the empire’s frontiers contracted during the later 19th century, refugees from the Balkans and Caucasus poured in, revital­izing agriculture, bolstering the labor force, and contributing cultural and sometimes economic capital (Findley, 2010, pp. 109, 158, 175). The Turkish Republic maintains a version of this policy to this day, though there has been a narrowing over the centuries of the differences accommodated. Even during Evliya’s day, the ingredients for a hybrid synthesis were a far cry from the heyday of the early Ottoman state, when, as Barkey argues, the emerging empire produced “a remarkable new elite that combined the best warriors and administrators: they included the best Christian and Muslim fighters, the ablest Christian and Muslim administrators, and religious men of many different persuasions: Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Sunni, and Sufi Islam” (Barkey, 2008, pp. 64-65). Barkey is careful to point out that this “Islamo-Christian synthesis was built not just because there was hybridity in the air,” but “because of the exigencies on the ground, because people realized that they required allies, and because they understood that the con­struction of a new society, a better edifice, would have to incorporate rather than exclude” (Barkey, 2008, p. 65). Barkey’s conclusion about what might be learned from this modeling of early Ottoman state formation—“This lesson has long since been forgotten” (Barkey, 2008, p.
65)—is both a call to action and an invitation to remember.The evidence in our diaries of migration histories reveals the learning curve we encountered along the road:

Donna’s Diary Entry: 23 September 2009, Day 2: We are in the Bagdat Restaurant (named for its proximity to the “road to Bagdat”) at lunch­time, our horses tethered in the woods. The owners proudly tell us that the surrounding villages are peopled by Bosnians, and, further south, Bulgarians, and by Laz (from the Black Sea), Circassians and Tatars. As the empire shrank, and there were Balkan wars especially, people were packed into villages—not indiscriminately, but with different groups sent to different villages. All, however, were expected to get along. Query: Does the Ottoman multicultural model work when the empire shrinks in this way?

In villages just off the major highways between Istanbul and Izmir we found Bosniaks, Georgians, Circassians (including Adigeyans), and Bulgarians, with Bosniaks identifying themselves as dating from the migra­tions of either the 1890s or the 1990s. There were also Turks who confided that their ancestors had arrived following the battle of Manzikert in 1071, when the Selcuks defeated the Byzantines, heralding the first major wave of Oghuz Turkish migrations into western Anatolia from Khorasan. Nearby were villagers who claimed Yoruk heritage (more recently settled nomads of Oghuz descent, who are often Alevis), and further south were those who regarded themselves as originally Germiyans or Selcuks or, going much fur­ther back in time, Phrygians. Adjacent to the battlefield of Dumlupinar, villages staked their identity not on an origin story but on their staunchness during the War of Independence against the Greeks. In one such village, Buyuk Oturak, between Afyon and U⅞ak, we found the yellow autumn cro­cus Sternbergia lutea, a Balkan species introduced by Bulgarians, known for its medicinal as well as ornamental uses. Traces of migrations and transgeo- graphical crossings, of decades and even centuries of people and species in transit and resettlement, were everywhere.

How were these heterogeneous collectivities faring? Some with long­term settlement in Turkey had done very well.

At Sukraniye, outside Bursa, we found a prosperous Bosniak enclave adjacent to the small farm and equestrian center Tabiat Qiftligi, belonging to Muzaffer Qilek, the CEO of one of Turkey’s most successful companies, the Qilek global brand of interior design and furniture for children. Born in Bursa, he traces his family tree back to Ottoman times, and he founded BIGMEV (Bosna Hersek ile Iliskileri Gelistirme Merkezi Vakfi, or “Central Foundation for Relationships Development with Bosnia Herzegovina”) “to promote “sus­tainable ancient relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey” (BIGMEV, 2020). Qilek means “strawberry,” and the familiar red and white logo adorned the key-rings, small flashlights, and notepads we were given, which found favor with small children along the route. Accommodation atExpedition and Reenactment 207 the farm was managed by a Bulgarian woman, a recent arrival, who sang the owner’s praises. The President of Bosnia was expected to be visiting in two days’ time, and it was hoped we might stay to meet him, but time was pressing, so we did not.

Some of the more recent arrivals were struggling with certain govern­ment attitudes, though they were understandably proud of their more mod­est achievements. Two days before, in Kizilhisar, a village high in the hills beyond Iznik, we had been equally warmly welcomed by Bosniak farmers who plied us with fresh milk, yogurt, and bread and joined us around the campfire. They lamented that the government was trying to increase the size of individually owned plots of cultivatable land that would be eligible for subsidies and loans. They regarded much of the village’s land—orchards and grazing as well as arable—as held in common. They were also worried about being forced to buy seeds instead of conserving their own. Having come from the former Yugoslavia, they were happy working in a socialist-collective and sustainable way. This meant that in practice they had something in common with older Turkish traditional farmers, those often referred to as “real farm­ers,” who preserve biodiversity by continuing to plant landrace crops from their own seeds (Aksoy, 2005, p.

238). Knowing that such traditional crops are best adapted to the local soil and climate conditions and that, therefore, they and their families will not starve so long as they keep planting them, these farmers continue to reserve at least a portion of their land for native strains of wheat, even if they also agree to plant more modern commercial varieties that promise larger yields (Aksoy, 2005, pp. 237-238). Everywhere, economic pressure from global agribusiness on small-holdings and organic and sustainable farming practices was taking its toll. But the new arrivals were at least pleased with the land they had been allotted. In that respect, the policy of resettlement had been reasonably well managed.

The same was true for Caucasian refugees, who were to be found in the Domaniq mountains: mountain villages for mountain people. The Georgians of Bahqekaya and the Adigeyan Circassians of Hacikara were long-term residents, dating to the later 19thcentury migrations following Ottoman-Russian wars. The older generation in Hacikara looked upon our horses with knowledgeable, nostalgic eyes (Finkel et al., 2011, p. 74), testifying to the Circassians’ formidable reputation as equestrian people. There are 21 Georgian villages in the district of Inegol (Zhuzhunadze, 2015). As the borders of the empire shrank, ethnic cleansing took place on the frontiers, with consequences for what Findley calls “the equilibria among religious communities,” as “the old interfaith symbiosis” was disrupted (Findley, 2010, p. 116). Although not all refugees were ethnically Turkish, as Findley notes, nevertheless the arrival of refugees from the late 19th cen­tury onwards “made the population both more Turkish-speaking and more Muslim” (Findley, 2010, p. 175) as new arrivals sought and found protection within the Ottomans’ “well-protected domains” according to the ideal of protection-within- difference.A densely woven multiethnic, though no longer multifaith, fabric of migrants from elsewhere, therefore, persist in the Turkish body politic, but how harmonious is this mixture? The residents of Babasultan, one of the villages proudly reporting that they had “come with” Manzikert, told us that they did not allow their daughters to marry residents of villages of more recent provenance.

They had stayed staunchly Ottoman even during the War of Independence rather than joining with republican forces. Other enclaves also seem to have preserved their identity-within-difference, though nobody else mentioned endogamous versus exogamous marriage as the critical issue. Fractious divisions which may have been present, as they were in Ovacik, were not commonly exposed. Those pressures on rural and agricultural communities to which we were made privy—as when wheat farmers west of Yenijehir reported that they were now being encouraged to purchase expen­sive harvesting equipment on an individual basis rather than through farm­ers’ cooperatives as in the past—were voiced, but only intermittently.

How different our reception might be now, given intensified internal antagonisms since the authoritarian crackdown following the failed coup of 2016, remains unclear. But hospitality to migrants remains a relative matter, in which Turkey’s long history (both Ottoman and republican) of resettle­ment policies undergirds a certain receptivity to incomers not common else­where. The first wave of refugees from Syria following the outbreak of civil war in 2011 often reported being offered opportunities to work and contrib­ute, and thereby feeling more at home in an environment more familiar to them than any European setting would be:

Around 3.5m Syrians live in Turkey, the largest number of refugees any­where in the world. Turkey is not fully signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention so, although Syrians there get access to health care, educa­tion and a small stipend, partly paid for by the European Union, they do not receive the many benefits that refugees in the EU get, such as accommodation and child benefit. Nevertheless, Turkey is proving a better refuge for many than Europe.

(The Economist, 2018)

Following the March 2016 deal with the EU, the Turkish government was paid to resettle Syrian refugees (European Council, 2016), but as Turkey’s suspension of the deal in July 2019 shows (Turkish Minute, 2019), it would be a mistake to sentimentalize some infinitely absorbing or accommodating property of contemporary Turkish society. The question of Turkishness and of a bounded nationalist identity hostile to alterity, must also be reckoned with, perhaps now more than ever before. Once again, the officially unac­knowledged or absent presence of Kurds within nation-state discourses, practices, and policies, and the state’s failure of acceptance of Kurdish dif­ference, is a remarkable and tragic exception to the much-vaunted rule of accommodation, absorption, and welcoming of difference.

That the weave of ethnicities, pattern of migrancy (whether chosen or forced), and service to society and the state has a long history of precedents comes alive in Evliya’s writing. This is particularly true in his account of his time in the entourage of his mother’s Abkhazian kinsman, Melek Ahmed Pa⅞a, who served as grand vizier in 1650 and then as a provincial governor in posts as far apart as Bosnia, OchakovZOzu (spanning eastern Bulgaria and Romania along the Black Sea into Ukraine), Diyarbekir, and Van before his death in 1662. There were other Abkhazians besides Melek Ahmed in gov­ernment service, as well as other Caucasian groups (Georgians, Circassians, Armenians), and there were also Bosniaks and representatives of the other Balkan regions, including Greeks and Albanians, to say nothing of Kurds and Arabs from the southeast. All these ethnic identities were at one time or another present in Ottoman administrations. At any given moment, a polyphony of accents and dialects was likely to be recorded. Evliya, who is even now a resource for historical linguists—so acute was his ear for lan­guages, especially for scurrilous or scandalous sayings, curses, and puns or jokes (Dankoff, 1991)—delights in recording dramatic action and dia­logue. When Melek Ahmed is serving as grand vizier, Evliya satirizes the “saber rattling” of his Kurdish deputy Kudde Kethuda from ^ermik, who has already been described speaking “in his Diyarbekir dialect,” now incit­ing repressive action against the citizenry during a period of rebellion in Anatolia and a tradesmen’s uprising in Istanbul (Dankoff and Murphey, 1991, pp. 83, 63). Citing the presence of “3,000 warriors” in the imperial barracks, “Abkhazians, Circassians, Georgians, Kurds, and Albanians,” all “tried in battle” (Dankoff and Murphey, 1991, p. 83), Kudde echoes the mixed ethnic origins of the imperial bureaucracy. (Evliya, himself both Abkhazian and Anatolian-Turkish, sympathizes with the ordinary people of Istanbul, protesting against administrative profiteering and indicating that the tradesmen have a point.) Evliya never fails to note the origins of administrators, whether Gurcu (Georgian) (Dankoff and Murphey, 1991, p. 92), Abkhaz, or Kurdish, and often finds confidantes on his travels from elsewhere, such as “Bo^nak Ali Zaim of Esztergom” (a Bosnian from Hungary), one of his mentors during his participation in a diplomatic mis­sion to Vienna (Dankoff and Kim, 2010, p. 234).

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Source: Agnew Vanessa, Tomann Juliane, Stach Sabine (eds.). Reenactment Case Studies: Global Perspectives on Experiential History. Routledge,2022. — 366 p.. 2022

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