The General Offensive of 1 March
The Serangan Umum 1 Maret was a carefully planned offensive by Indonesian troops on Dutch positions in Yogyakarta. It took place during the National Revolution (1945-1949),3 which resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia.
The war began in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender in World War II, which had led to the liberation of Indonesia from Japanese occupation. Pro-Republican Indonesians quickly took advantage of the power vacuum, and only two days after the capitulation, the nationalists Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed independence on 17 August 1945. A few days later, a central government was installed in Jakarta, with Sukarno as president and Hatta as vice-president. However, the allied forces wanted to restore the colonial regime after the Japanese surrender. Java was appointed to fall under British jurisdiction, leading to various armed struggles between Republican soldiers and the British, the most famous being the battle for Surabaya (10 November 1945). With British assistance, the Dutch restored their administration in Jakarta, which prompted the Indonesian nationalists to remove the Republican capital to Yogyakarta in 1946. Yogyakarta, which is a monarchy, became an important site during the revolution as former Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX publicly supported the newly formed Republic (Ahimsa-Putra, 2012; Iqbal, 2010).In May 1947, the Dutch decided to attack the Republic directly. They launched two military offensives, carrying the infamous term politionele acties [police actions].4 The first one focused on regaining control over lucrative economic regions such as plantations and oil installations. The second attack was directed at the new center of resistance: Yogyakarta. On 19 December 1948, the attack termed Operatie Kraai [Operation Crow] led to the capture of some of the Republic’s prominent leaders: Sukarno, Hatta, and foreign minister Agus Salim.
The rest of the Indonesian troops retreated to the countryside in order to prepare for guerrilla warfare.On 1 March 1949, Indonesians conducted a guerrilla attack on Dutch positions in the city, the Serangan Umum 1 Maret, sometimes referred to as Enam Jam di Yogya [Six Hours in Yogyakarta]. Aware that the Dutch had military superiority, the Indonesian troops aimed to inspire the revolutionary spirit, increase international attention to Indonesian resistance, and demoralize Dutch soldiers (Iqbal, 2010, p. 148). Starting at 6:00 in the morning, the end of the curfew, they attacked positions from four directions and were able to regain control over the city for six hours. At noon, they retreated before support for the Dutch soldiers would arrive.
The surprise raid was seen as a great success post hoc. Not long after, the United States adopted a more resolute stance by publicly condemning the Dutch in the United Nations, threatening to cut off the financial aid the Dutch economy had been receiving after World War II. The Netherlands were forced “to abandon its final attempt at empire in Indonesia” (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 28). By April 1949, the Dutch had accepted preliminary meetings with the Republican government and allowed them to return to Yogyakarta. On 29 June 1949, Yogyakarta became the first place from which Dutch soldiers peacefully withdrew. From 23 August until 2 November, the Round Table Conference was held in The Hague, leading to the formal transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949.
While it later became one of the most systematically commemorated historic battles in Indonesian history, the Serangan Umum 1 Maret was relatively unknown outside Java during Sukarno’s presidency (Ahimsa- Putra, 2012, p. 159). However, after 1967, when Suharto came to power, it strongly increased in popularity with an annual ceremony and speech, a monument in the city center, and two state-produced docudramas, Yellow Young Coconut Leaves (1980) and Attack at Dawn (1982), often screened as part of the school curriculum.
An annual commemoration ceremony also consisted of a reenactment staged at the former colonial fortress Benteng Vredeburg by “student regiments from universities in Yogyakarta, members of the army, [and] veterans” (Ahimsa-Putra, 2012, p. 165).The immortalization and popularization of the event during Suharto’s New Order can be largely explained by the fact that he presented himself as the main protagonist of the attack. In Suharto’s autobiography, Soeharto: My Thoughts, Words and Deeds (1999), he wrote that after listening to the radio about debates within the UN concerning the Dutch position in Indonesia, he became increasingly frustrated and “took the decision to carry out an attack in daytime, to show how the Dutch lied [about their power]” (Ramadhan and Dwipayana, 1991, p. 58 [my translation]). Therefore, he came up with the idea of a surprise attack. Suharto, who was a lieutenant colonel at the time, presented himself as the initiator, architect, and commander of the Serangan Umum 1 Maret and therefore legitimized his own rule as a pivotal figure in the struggle for independence.
The question of who initiated the attack first gained attention in 1985 when the mayor of Yogyakarta, Purwokusomo, raised the issue during an interview (Ahimsa-Putra, 2012, p. 166). However, after Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of Yogyakarta passed away in 1989, it faded into the background. The Sultan, who had also played an important role as military governor, was seen by many as the true initiator. When mass demonstrations in 1998 forced Suharto’s resignation and ended the authoritarian rule, the controversy reemerged in the public debate. After the Reformasi [reform], not only intellectuals but also veterans increasingly criticized Suharto’s version of the event publicly. Many claimed that it was the Sultan who had listened to the radio and come up with the idea of “shock therapy” to inspire the revolutionary spirit (Ahimsa-Putra, 2012, p. 169). The Sultan, who could not participate in the attack due to his role as the head of the Yogyakarta kingdom, had sent a messenger to Commander-in-Chief Sudirman, who then mobilized Lieutenant Colonel Suharto.
This period saw a growing consensus among historians that the initiator was not Suharto: as a lieutenant colonel, he would not have been able to mobilize troops without the consent of his superiors (Ahimsa-Putra, 2012, p.
172). An academic seminar in 2000, and an increasing number of papers and newspaper articles that have been published since shared a similar perspective. As a response to the public debate, minister Yuwono Sudarsono ordered an investigation into the Serangan Umum 1 Maret, and the next edition of the official textbooks used in schools gave more credit to the role of the Sultan (Schulte Nordholt, 2004, p. 12). However, at the time of this writing, the debate still received attention. On 2 March 2018, an article was published on the website Detik News suggesting there was “new evidence” that the initiative came from the Royal Palace of the Sultan. Yet, no alterations have been made to the public representations that credit Suharto, such as the monument in Yogyakarta’s city center.